The Studies in Intelligence

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Beyond Spy vs. Spy The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services Peter Mattis“ Clear understanding of Chinese intelligence serves more than the CI mission.

Introduction

Scholars of intelligence and comparative politics have tended to overlook intelligence services as bureaucratic organizations and as components of government information-processing systems. As a consequence, conventionally trained analysts and most journalists tend to overlook the role of intelligence and security services in extending and maintaining state power and international policy goals. In the case of China, the intense focus of writers on the ups and downs of US-Chinese relations seldom leads to efforts to more deeply understand China and the sources of its government’s behavior, and, in particular, the effects that Chinese intelligence services might have on that behavior. Even when journalists and other commentators address the seemingly monthly appearance of new details of Chinese human and technical espionage, analysts tend to focus on each incident as a bellwether of the US-Chinese relationship or as a straightforward counterintelligence (CI) issue. Protecting the integrity of US intelligence and policy processes is an important task for the US Intelligence Community, but clear understanding of Chinese intelligence serves more than the CI mission. At the core, analysis of Beijing’s intelligence institutions is about trying to understand systematically how the Chinese government uses information to inform its policy formulation, guidance to diplomats and security officials, and the execution of its policies. Just as importantly, China’s civilian intelligence and security agencies are empowered to arrest and to operate inside and outside China. The distinction between intelligence and internal security policy is minimal, institutionally speaking. This makes these services not just part of a policy staff process but an integral tool for the preservation of the power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

1. 1.    Yet, very little is known about the organizations themselves and their importance to China and its future.
2. 2.    The Analytical Questions The Chinese intelligence services (CIS) present three distinct analytic challenges critical to understanding a Beijing has consistently identified this goal as a “core interest” of China, indicating a willingness to use force if necessary. Analysis of Chinese Intelligence 48 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No
3. 3.    (September 2012) the future of China and US-Chinese relations. The CIS and Domestic Political Activists First, insights into China’s political future require analysis of the competition between domestic political activists and the security services. A decade ago, China’s security state appeared to be eroding as modern communications technology swept across the country. Today, domestic intelligence agencies have adapted to the Internet and mobile communications and are capable of following electronic breadcrumbs left behind as people move through China’s “informatized” (xinxihua) society. Whether the current regime stays in power or a political movement generates enough momentum for political reform will depend on how effectively China’s internal security forces perform their work. Evolution of Chinese Intelligence The second issue to be watched is the evolution of the Chinese intelligence community, particularly on the civilian side. Internally oriented security services tend to reinforce the leadership’s worst fears about potential adversaries, the United States in particular,3 and China’s civilian intelligence organizations both focus on internal security. The degree to which Beijing resolves the issues of overlapping jurisdictions—or, at least, insulates the foreign intelligence function from internal security—will help determine the tone and relative objectivity of foreign intelligence products reaching the leadership. As Chinese foreign interests widen, Beijing increasingly will call upon the intelligence services to provide inputs to assessments of the intentions of states capable of harming China’s interests abroad. Information Processing Systems The final challenge is evaluation of the Chinese intelligence community’s information processing systems. The civilian ministries include national, provincial, and local elements, which operate under competing horizontal and vertical lines of authority. The military intelligence services under the General Staff Department compose China’s only all-source intelligence capability, but the mechanics of intelligence fusion in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are opaque. How these agencies collect, process, and disseminate intelligence affects Chinese behavior, and, with the rise of cyberspace issues, the volumes of information are potentially staggering and difficult to manage. Knowing how this system works is a prerequisite to ensuring US leaders can be certain US statements and acts are interpreted as they were intended. In this essay I will outline a research agenda on the Chinese intelligence services built around these three challenges, and I will suggest some of the factors that should underpin future analysis . . .. Fundamentals of Chinese Approaches Before addressing the analytic questions, I will briefly address some misunderstandings of the nature of Chinese intelligence operations. Many, perhaps most, US observers of Chinese intelligence have argued that the Chinese think about and collect intelligence in ways fundamentally different from Western or even Russian intelligence. In large measure this perception stems from Chinese attempts to acquire, legally and otherwise, Western technology information to support Chinese modernization and economic priorities. These efforts have been equated with Chinese intelligence collection and have been labeled the “mosaic” or “grains of sand” approach. Chinese intelligence, it has been argued in this context, has four basic tenets:

·      Chinese intelligence focuses on ethnic Chinese as sources;

·      It relies on amateur collectors rather than professional intelligence officers; It does not use intelligence tradecraft familiar to Western services;

·      It pursues high volumes of low-grade (if not entirely unclassified) information.

4.    This view falls down on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, both US and Chinese analysts describe intelligence in similar terms—a specialized form of knowledge for reducing uncertainty during decision making. Empirically, the cases linked to the Chinese intelligence services—not As Chinese foreign interests widen, Beijing increasingly will call upon the intelligence services. Analysis of Chinese Intelligence Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3. (September 2012) 49 simply the illegal activities of Chinese nationals or companies—demonstrate that professional Chinese intelligence officers use familiar tradecraft in formalized intelligence relationships with their sources. Additionally, cases are not limited to ethnic-Chinese whatever their nationality.

5.    Chinese Doctrine Chinese writings on intelligence bear remarkable similarity to familiar US definitions of intelligence functions and goals. Sun Tzu taught that “foreknowledge” (xianzhi) allowed commanders to outmaneuver opponents. More modern definitions range from “activating [catalytic] knowledge” (jihuo zhishi) to information to protect national security, domestic stability, or corporate interests in a competitive environment.

6.    Chinese military scholars today frame intelligence as a distinct subset of knowledge, defined by its relevance to decision makers and a competitive environment. Specifically, intelligence is transmittable (chuandi xing) and is knowledge that satisfactorily (manzu xing) resolves a specific decision-making problem.

7.    Empirically, Chinese intelligence officers consistently have demonstrated the use of widely practiced professional tradecraft, having successfully exploited for political and military intelligence purposes agents with vulnerabilities familiar to anyone who follows the subject. The use of such tradecraft goes back to the most famous early known cases, Larry Wu-Tai Chin and Bernard Boursicot (M. Butterfly). The former began in the 1940s and latter in the 1960s. Similar techniques have been applied in more recent cases—Gregg Bergersen, Chi Mak, James Fondren, and Tai-Shen Kuo. These revolved around a single Chinese intelligence officer, and possibly a second.

8.    Each of these sources was paid for sensitive information and all were aware of an intelligence relationship. A consequence of the Conventional View Misapprehension of Chinese intelligence practices has consequences. Most basically, the “mosaic” or “grains of sand” concepts fail to guide the organization, prioritization, and execution of CI efforts against Chinese national and corporate intelligence threats because the concepts do not differentiate between the varied Chinese collectors and their motivations as well as their varied signatures and risks to the United States:

·      The “mosaic” concept does not help clarify what aspects of Chinese information and technology collection are important, whether the collection is linked to Chinese intelligence services or not. If “Chinese intelligence” includes everything  from the intelligence services to a corporation to a criminal entrepreneur, then the term becomes almost meaningless.

·      A belief that the Chinese rely on amateur operatives risks leading CI professionals to dismiss or be inattentive to the threat posed by China’s professional services.9

·      When economic espionage with no connection to the Chinese intelligence services is interpreted as “Chinese intelligence,” less attention will be paid to what those organizations actually do. The Chinese intelligence services and the Chinese defense industries are distinct entities, although they may sometimes work for mutual benefit.

·      The “grains of sand” concept focuses analytic attention on the CI risk individuals pose rather than on government intelligence services. Still, it should be borne in mind that while the evidence shows that Chinese and US intelligence cona