The Chinese intelligence services have balanced
finding targets with access and sources able to travel back-and-forth to China.
That many of these individuals were ethnically Chinese is a function more of
opportunity than intent, because China-based case officers have run most known
Chinese operations. Moreover, many of Beijing’s intelligence targets are, in
fact, ethnically Chinese, such as Taiwan and overseas dissident groups—where
foreigners are targeted, the results are cases like Boursicot’s and Glenn
Shriver’s. b After the Congressional investigation into the Chinese espionage
scandals of the 1990s, the committee tried to warn future analysts to be clear
in their distinctions. The Cox Committee’s final report admonished, “Those
unfamiliar with Chinese intelligence practices often conclude that, because
intelligence services conduct clandestine operations, all clandestine
operations are directed by intelligence agencies. In the case of [China], this
is not always the rule.” Chinese writings on intelligence bear remarkable
similarity to familiar US definitions of intelligence functions and goals. Analysis
of Chinese Intelligence 50 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September
2012) excepts and methods may not be too far apart, intelligence organizations
operate in the service of national policy. The needs and priorities of decision
makers guide the activities of intelligence services and their operations.
Beijing and Washington are engaged in dramatically different competitions that
need active intelligence support. For example, counterterrorism in both
countries focuses on noticeably different problems. US intelligence agencies
primarily are concerned with terrorists abroad and their efforts to go
operational within the United States. China, by contrast, confronts domestic
terrorists that apparently have relatively fewer foreign links. The operational
challenges related to collecting intelligence on these essentially different
terrorist threats produce different kinds of intelligence activity. Observers
should be careful not to go too far in describing the similarities between the
two systems, especially given the differing cultures and ways of thinking.
1.
The Challenges
Thinking of China’s intelligence services as bureaucratic organizations raises
questions of what functions they serve as part of the state’s administrative
apparatus and how well they perform those functions. Below, I will outline what
I believe are the three principal analytic challenges to understanding the
Chinese intelligence services and their relationship to the future of China and
US-Chinese relations.
1. Assessing China’s Internal Security Apparatus
Informed assessments of the capabilities and performance of China’s internal
security system may not have direct payoffs in terms of immediate US policy
goals, but they are key elements in evaluations of China’s stability—in turn a
key factor in a number of US strategic interests in Asia. Analysis of China’s
internal security forces is the first step toward a net assessment of the
competition between China’s political reformers and its governing apparatus.
While the United States may not wish to influence this contest directly, US
policymakers should be aware of its progress and the viability of Chinese
opposition. For at least the past 15 years, China has appeared precariously
unstable; various sources have noted mounting unrest—now well over 100,000
“mass incidents” per year.11 Reports and photographs of violent demonstrations
in various places have given rise to analysis that “Beijing’s control over the
coercive system, as well as that system’s capacity to maintain social control,
appears to be slipping.”12 Since that assertion was published in 2001, Beijing
has reinvigorated its coercive apparatus. As the Chinese citizenry gained
access to the Internet and mobile communications, the authorities have
increased their investment in internal security. According to press reports,
State Council budget figures for 2010 and 2011—even if not broken out by
agency—show that the expenditures on internal security systems have outpaced
the cost of China’s dramatic military modernization, coming in at $95 billion
compared to $92 billion in 2010 and up to $111 billion for 2012.13 Following
several years of local level experimentation with intelligence-led policing,
State Councilor and Minister of Public Security (MPS) Meng Jianzhu announced
the nation-wide adoption of “public security informatization” (gong’an
xinxihua) at an MPS conference in 2008. “Public security informatization”
refers to the process of integrating information more closely into police
operations, including both domestic intelligence gathering and information
management components.
On the former, the MPS directs its officers to focus
on collecting information about potential social disturbances. The most
well-known example of the latter is the Golden Shield project, which is
primarily about linking a variety of national and
Local-level databases with personal information
collected from hotels, phone companies, and other businesses that require
true-name registration. This data then can be aggregated and used to generate
tasking for police stations automatically when a person-of-interest turns up in
that jurisdiction.14 What Beijing really appears to be aiming for is creation
of the capacity to create a panoptic state, a capacity that goes beyond what
normally is thought of as domestic intelligence. In the CCP’s leading journal,
China’s senior leader responsible for security and stability, Zhou Yongkang,
laid out the desired “social management system” (shehui guanli tixi), which he
said would include integrating MPS What Beijing really appears to be aiming for
is creation of the capacity to create a panoptic state. Analysis of Chinese
Intelligence
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September
2012) 51 intelligence with public opinion monitoring and propaganda to shape
people’s decision making about appropriate actions in the public sphere Since the publication of Zhou’s article, the MPS
has launched two new efforts to change the level of its public engagement. On
27 September
2011, the MPS formally approved a nationwide policy
for public security elements’ use of microblogs to spread a ministry perspective
and inform Chinese citizens about safety concerns.16 In December 2011, the MPS
also pushed police officers out of their stations as part of a campaign to win
over the hearts and minds of the Chinese people—and to monitor public opinion.
17. The idea of information control has deep roots in
Chinese strategic thought and may provide insight into how Beijing is acting on
its domestic ambitions. Beginning with Sun Tzu, Chinese strategists have
envisioned a seamless web of counterespionage, information collection, agent
provocateurs, and propagandists—what Sun Tzu called the “divine skein.”18
Intelligence as information to support decision making is only one part of the
overarching idea of achieving information superiority. For example, modern PLA
strategists divided strategic information operations into multiple categories
including manipulation of adversary decision making, intelligence and offensive
counterintelligence, and efforts to erode or destroy an opponent’s sensors,
both human and technical.
19. The question is whether these ideas permeate
internal security and how far the MPS and MSS go in attempting to draw out
potential dissidents—not just identifying already active subversive elements.
20. The MPS rejuvenation fits within a broader
strategy of localizing grievances while preserving the legitimacy of the
central government in Beijing.
21. The visible signs that this strategy is working
include examples of protestors in Guangdong Province, who, despite their
problem with corrupt local officials, still appealed to Beijing.
22. The
potential ability to track millions of people and register their communications
would support this strategy by making it easier to follow activists and
malcontents wherever they go, physically and virtually. People like the lawyers
Chen Guangcheng and Gao Zhisheng, artist Ai Weiwei, and authors Chen Wei, Yu
Jie, and Liu Xiaobo are dangerous because they draw attention to systemwide grievances
and directly challenge the CCP’s role in perpetuating official abuse.
23. The final question about the MPS and related
security offices is what is their degree of political influence. Do the
internal security forces merely execute policy or are they intimately involved
in its creation—and, consequently, in CCP policymaking and strategy
formulation? Little open-source material other than published career
information and public leadership functions—help in analyzing this question.
The largely unchronicled rise of the MPS during the past decade suggests Meng
and his predecessor Zhou Yongkang are largely responsible for reforming the MPS
and raising the profile of “social management” and “preserving stability.” Yet
despite the growing importance of the CCP’s efforts to monitor and shape an
increasingly contentious Chinese society
24. nowhere can be a found a public profile of either
of these two men that analyzes their impact on policy or the organizations they
oversee.
25. Evolution of the Chinese Intelligence Community
While analysts of Chinese intelligence activities often invoke China’s long
history of espionage, the Chinese intelligence community as currently
constituted is less than 30 years old. While culture matters, institutions are
affected by much more—including incentives, leadership attention, and
measurements of performance. Assessments of developing bureaucratic and
political relationships may be difficult, even impossible, using only
open-source material, but clearer understanding of them will help US
intelligence and policymakers understand the conflicting interests that will
shape the Chinese intelligence apparatus and its contribution to Chinese
policymaking, especially as Beijing’s interests abroad grow and create new
bureaucratic space and possibly greater influence for the intelligence service
most able to respond to leadership needs. Since its creation in 1983, the
Ministry of State Security (MSS) has The idea of information control has deep
roots in Chinese strategic thought. Analysis of Chinese Intelligence
52 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September
2012) fought to carve out its operational and policy space from the Ministry of
Public Security. When Beijing created the MSS, it fused the remnants of the
CCP’s Investigation Department with the intelligence and
counterintelligence-related components of the MPS. The first minister of state
security had been a senior vice minister of public security. Thus, the MSS lacked
a distinct identity, drawing as it did from several organizations that were
still in the process of reconstituting from the chaos of the Cultural
Revolution (1966–76).
26. Recent developments suggest Beijing may be placing
more emphasis on the MSS and other intelligence services to develop stronger
foreign intelligence capabilities. The first sign was the selection of Geng
Huichang as the new MSS chief in a ministerial shakeup in August 2007. Geng
became the first minister with a foreign affairs, rather than internal
security, background. He reportedly served as a professor at the MSS affiliated
Beijing International Relations Institute and as a scholar, and later director,
at the MSS think tank, the China Institutes of Contemporary International
Relations.
26. A second sign is the emergence since 2008 of PRC
intelligence operations conducted entirely outside of China. Until then, no
exposed Chinese espionage case occurred without operational activity inside
China —that is, no operation occurred without a physical connection to China.
The Swedish first identified the new approach in 2008, when they uncovered
Chinese intelligence officers in the Chinese embassy in Stockholm who had
recruited a Uyghur émigré to spy on fellow émigrés in Europe and beyond. The
Germans may have identified the second, alleging the existence of a spy ring
run by a Chinese intelligence officer out of the Chinese consulate in Munich in
2009. Last year a case involved the Taiwan Army’s director of
telecommunications and electronic information, who was recruited in Bangkok.
27. Understanding is also needed of the role of
military intelligence (especially2PLA) in any competition for shares of the
state budget and for influence within the central leadership. Chinese military
modernization, especially the PLA’s development of precision-guided weaponry,
has created a new need for timely tactical intelligence—targeting and data
guidance, as well as information to guide bomb damage assessments, for
example.28 While 2PLA has been known as “China’s
CIA,”29 the military’s need for more intelligence
support would have created pressure for 2PLA to focus more on military
requirements rather than national policymakers.30 Chinese policymakers—with the
exception of two civilian members of the Central Military Commission —can
exercise little direct influence over the PLA. Thus the PLA’s intelligence
needs could lead it to monopolize intelligence resources or underinvest in
capabilities that might otherwise go to meet the requirements of the central
leadership. If PLA intelligence resources become more internally directed, as
suggested by senior personnel appointments, 31 then Beijing may lose an
alternative to the internally oriented civilian security and intelligence
apparatus. A second factor to be understood is the degree to which bureaucratic
inertia and the influence of the internal security elements of the Chinese
intelligence and security apparatus affect developments. The civilian
organizations, the MPS and MSS, report to the political-legal system (zhengfa
xitong) overseen by Zhou Yongkang, who also sits on Politburo Standing
Committee. His portfolio emphasizes preserving internal stability (weihu
wending gongzuo)
Recent developments suggest Beijing may be placing
more emphasis on the MSS and other intelligence services to develop more
capable foreign intelligence capabilities. Chinese Intelligence and Security
Services a Civilian Ministry of State Security (MSS)
Counterespionage and Counterintelligence; Foreign
Intelligence; Domestic Intelligence Ministry of Public Security (MPS) National
Police; Domestic Intelligence; Military Second Department of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department (2PLA) Foreign Intelligence;
Defense Attaché System; Imagery Intelligence; Tactical Reconnaissance Third
Department of the PLA General Staff Department (3PLA) Signals Intelligence a
Other major intelligence and security departments not specifically discussed in
this essay include the Fourth Department of the PLA General Staff Department
(4PLA); the Liaison Office of the PLA General Political Department; the
intelligence departments of the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and Second Artillery;
and the State Secrecy Bureau.Analysis of Chinese Intelligence
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September
2012) 53 It is highly likely that whatever reaches the top will have been
influenced and, according to the Hong Kong by local procedures and biases.
press, Zhou does not sit on any of the foreign policymaking bodies, such as the
Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG).32 The minister of state security
only gained an FALSG seat in 1998. .
33. Both civilian ministries also have substantial
portions—probably the majority—of their personnel in provincial departments or
local bureaus, which report to the provincial and local party committees in
addition to their home ministries. Foreign affairs however are not handled at
the subnational level, encouraging these local MPS and MSS units to focus on
provincial, rather than national, concerns like internal stability.
3. Understanding the Chinese Intelligence Processing
System If US policymakers hope to shape the way China exercises its growing
influence in the world, 34 they will require clear understanding of how Chinese
intelligence interprets official US statements and intelligence about the
United States its services collect and evaluate. Will information the United
States purposefully transmits reach China’s senior civilian and military
decision makers? How it is interpreted will depend on the biases and underlying
assumptions about the United States that each of the services have, subjects we
know little about. Without answers to such questions the risk will be high that
US statements and actions will be misinterpreted. In part the answers to such
questions lie in understanding the ideological and political prisms through
which Chinese officials at multiple levels view the United States. In part the
answers lie in the institutional frameworks through which intelligence about
the United States flows and the ways in which the Chinese manage intelligence
derived from the new digital world of large data. Institutional Frameworks
China, like the United States, has separate civilian and military
organizations,but it also has components of national security and intelligence
distributed throughout provincial and, in some cases, lower levels. This is
true both for civilian ministries, which have provincial and lower level
bureaus, and for PLA intelligence organizations. An excellent military example
is the Third Department of the PLA’s General Staff Department (3PLA). The
3PLA—responsible for signals intelligence, computer network reconnaissance
(cyber), and technical countermeasures—has offices and technical reconnaissance
bureaus in each of China’s seven military regions and several major cities,
35. and it is likely that the Chinese services have
their own training and procurement units in these areas. If so, it follows that
regional differences in performance and equipment will exist throughout the
PLA’s intelligence organizations.
36. With multiple levels between the sources of
intelligence and China’s leadership, it is highly likely that whatever reaches
the top will have been influenced by local procedures and biases.37
Understanding how each of China’s intelligence organizations processes reports,
identifies important issues, and validates information will be key to
understanding how Chinese perceptions are shaped.a 38 Even if understanding
these processes does not provide the insights British signals intelligence did
into German intentions, it forms the beginnings of serious assessment and
awareness. A related question is to what extent are institutional and
procedural biases reflected in the public writings of Chinese
intelligence-affiliated analysts. Examples are the works of analysts at the
military intelligence–run China Institute of International and Strategic
Studies and the MSS-run China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.
39. Are their
writings useful in understanding how PLA and MSS intelligence analysts filter
and interpret world events and foreign intentions? Large Data Processing The
reported scale of China’s hacking activities suggests terabytes of data may be
finding their way to Chinese intelligence organizations.
40. What happens to the data there remains unknown.
The intricacy of China’s civilian and military security and intelligence
organizations and the variety of services they are presumed to provide to a
multitude of government organizations make it a Students of deception basically
come to the same conclusions about what makes deception—influencing an
adversary to make disadvantageous decisions by denying or supplying
information—function well. Would-be deceivers need time, control over their own
information, channels through which pass information, and the ability to
monitor the adversary’s thinking and behavior. Analysis of Chinese Intelligence
54.Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September
2012) Ferreting out of internal, generally secret, processes may seem irrelevant
to national policy or the daily diplomatic and commercial relations, but it is
no less important for analysts and policymakers to understand. difficult, if
not impossible, to examine solely through open sources. Key questions include
how will the Chinese take on the challenge of processing vast amounts of data
that human beings, even in the large numbers Chinese intelligence presumably
could recruit, are unable to process. The challenge goes well beyond simple
translation problems or conversion of data into searchable formats by
organizations with different bureaucratic practices and jargon. How
exploitation of such data adds value to Chinese leaders and policymakers is yet
another question—one which Western services have probably not even begun to
address, let alone resolve.
Conclusion
China’s intelligence services have long been
underanalyzed as major bureaucratic organizations and components of state
power. This may have mattered relatively little during China’s inward-looking
and underdeveloped years. Today, its leaders are significant players on the
world stage, and understanding how and what they learn about the world and how
they formulate their policy choices is more important than ever. Given the
complex choices the Chinese face, it is likely that their intelligence services
will play an even greater role than they have in the past.
41. The intelligence and intelligence analysis
challenges the Chinese face will look familiar to many US analysts:
• Determining
sources of energy and maintaining the security of delivery routes.
• Protecting
Chinese officials and citizens working abroad.
•Preserving markets for Chinese goods and defense of
key supply chains, among many others. All of these interests will put pressure
on the intelligence services to be more active abroad against a wide variety of
targets, both official and not. How intelligence performs missions in support
of these and other goals will also serve as indicators of Chinese national
policy, and possibly in some cases as indicators of independent policymaking in
the services. At the same time, understanding Chinese intelligence remains
crucial to understanding the state of China’s internal stability, although this
topic cannot be watched solely from an intelligence perspective—the pace of
economic development, indications of the PLA’s loyalty to the CCP, and signs of
the party’s cohesion are other keys. Recent Western misconceptions about
Chinese intelligence operations and insufficient scholarly attention to
intelligence organizations have limited awareness of how these institutions
actually function, but, as China’s influence grows and domestic unrest
continues, failure to remedy these deficiencies will be to the detriment of the
United States and others with similar policy perspectives. Finally, open-source
researchers are likely only to be able to establish the broad contours and
systemic pressures under which Chinese intelligence operates. They may also be
able to offer the questions in need of research. But much of that research
involves the ferreting out of internal, generally secret, processes. That work
may seem irrelevant to broad national policy or the daily blow-byblow of
diplomatic and commercial relations, but it is no less important for analysts
and policymakers to understand. . . .Analysis of Chinese Intelligence Studies
in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) 55 Endnotes
1. See, China’s Peaceful Development, Information
Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, 6 September
2011.
2. Ely Ratner and Steven Weber, “American Policy
toward China: Getting Beyond the Friend-or-Foe Fallacy,” New America Foundation Policy Paper, June 2011. For example, many
analysts and commentators focus on the Chinese People’s LiberationArmy’s (PLA) new equipment and senior most leaders at
the expense of analyzing doctrine, internal self-assessments of PLA modernization,
and training exercisesthat are more critical to Beijing’s ability to use force.
See, Dennis Blasko, “China in 2012: Shifting Perspectives–Assessing the PLA from the
Ground Up,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 12, no. 2 (20 January 2012).
3. Christopher Andrew, “Intelligence, International
Relations, and Under-Theorisation,” Intelligence and National Security 19, no.
2 (2004): 170–84; Michael Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age.
(London: Frank Cass, 2001), 19–20.
4. For the three most accessible descriptions of the
“mosaic,” “grains of sand,” or “human-wave” approach to intelligence
collection, see David Wise, Tiger Trap: America’s Secret Spy War with China
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2011), 5–19; “Special
Report: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics,” StratFor, 24 March 2010; and
Howard DeVore, China’s Intelligence and Internal Security Forces (Coulsdon, UK:
Jane’s Information Group, 1999). For a separate analysis of the validity of
these propositions for Chinese intelligence related to the Glenn Duffie Shriver
case, see, Peter Mattis, “Shriver Case Highlights Traditional Chinese
Espionage,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 10, no 22 (5 November 2010).
5. The Chinese intelligence services have balanced
finding targets with access and sources able to travel to and out of China.
That many of these individuals are ethnic Chinese is in part of a function of
the fact that most operations have been managed
by intelligence officers inside China and in part a
reflection of Beijing’s concern for Chinese dissidents abroad and developments
in Taiwan. See Peter Mattis, Chinese Intelligence Operations Reconsidered:
Toward a New Baseline, M.A. Thesis, Georgetown University (April 2011).
6. Chen Jiugeng, “Guanyu qingbao he xinxi [Regarding
Intelligence and Information],” Qingbao Zazhi (Journal of Information) 19, no.
1 (January 2000): 4–6.
7. Yan Jinzhong, Junshi qingbao xue [The Study of
Military Intelligence] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2003), 12; Cheng Lei, “Qingbao
yuan yu qingbao genyuan [Intelligence Sources and Intelligence’s Roots],”
Tushuguan zazhi [Library Journal], No. 3 (1994), 16–18.
8. Wise, Tiger Trap,
221–26, 238.
9. This deficiency shows in the publication record. Of
the books and articles written on Chinese intelligence, only three, however
minimally, examine the Chinese intelligence services as organizations and a
fourth explores public security within the context of governance. For the
former, see, Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations; Eftimiades, “China’s
Ministry of
State Security Comes of Age in the International
Arena,” Intelligence and National Security; and Devore, China’s Intelligence
and Internal Security Forces. For the latter, see, Murray Scot Tanner and Eric
Green, “Principals and Secret Agents: Central
Versus Local Control over Policing and Obstacles to
‘Rule of Law’ in China,” The China Quarterly no. 191 (September 2007): 644–70.
10. These differences can be explained both
psychologically and philosophically, see, respectively, Richard Nisbett, The
Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently…And Why, (New
York: The Free Press, 2003); Robert Ames and Bruce Hall, Thinking through
Confucius (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987).
11. “Mass incidents” presumably refer to riots or
other kinds of public demonstrations against local authorities. The last
official statistics were released in 2006 and placed the number of mass
incidents around 90,000. Leaked figures and Chinese scholars’ estimates range
as high 180,000 per year in more recent years. See, Barbara Demick, “Protests
in China over Local Grievances Surge, and Get Hearing,” Los Angeles Times, 8
October 2011; Jeremy Page, “Wave of Unrest Rocks China: Threats to Social Order
Increasingly Hit Cities, Bringing Iron-Fist Response,” Wall Street Journal, 14
June 2011.Analysis of Chinese Intelligence
56 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September
2012)
12. Murray Scot Tanner, “Cracks in the Wall: China’s
Eroding Coercive State,” Current History 100, no. 647 (September
2001): 243. 13. Leslie Hook, “Beijing Raises Spending
on Internal Security,” Financial Times, March 6, 2011; “China boosts domestic
security spending by 11.5 pct,” Reuters, 5 March 2012. 14. Peter Mattis,
“China’s Adaptive Approach to the Information Counter-Revolution,” Jamestown
Foundation China Brief 11, no. 10 (3 June 2011). 15. Zhou Yongkang, “Jiaqiang
he chuangxin shehui guanli; jianli jianquan zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi shehui
guanli tixi [Strengthen and Innovate Social Management; Construct a Sound
Social Management System under Socialism with Chinese Characteristics], Qiushi
[Seeking Truth], 1 May 2011. 16. “Gong’an bu: ba gong’an weibo jianshe cheng
jingwu gongkai xin pingtai [MPS: Let microblog construction take police
openness to a new level],” Xinhua, 27 September 2011; Liu Yang and Wu Min,
“Gongkai wei xian fuwu wei ben; zunzhong junzhong shunying minyi; goujian juyou
xianming tese de gong’an weibo jun [Place openness first and be
service-oriented; respect the masses and heed public opinion; construct a
public security microblogging group with distinct characteristics],” China
Police Daily, 27 September 2011. See also, Peter Mattis, “Public Security
Officially Joins the Blogosphere,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 11, no. 16
(30 September 2011).
17. Liu Xuegang, “Renmin gong’an bao kaizhan ruhe
tigao qunzhong gongzuo nengli da taolun [China Police Daily reports a
great discussion over how to improve capability for
mass work],” Renmin Gong’an Bao [China Police Daily], 31 January
2012.
18. Michael Warner, “The Divine Skein: Sun Tzu on
Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 4 (August 2006):
483–92.
19. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of
Military Strategy (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 2005),
340–343; Li Yueli, “Lun junshi qingbao zuozhan [On
Military Intelligence Warfare],” Qingbao Zazhi [Journal of Information]
21, No. 7 (July 2002): 99–100.
20. The idea of infiltrating potentially dissenting
sectors of society continues to be present, see, Li Anjin, “Mao Zedong tongyi
zhanxian sixiang de dangdai jiazhi [The Contemporary
Value of Mao Zedong’s ‘United Front’ Thinking],” Xuexi Shibao
[Study Times], 8 August 2011. For a full explanation
of “united front” activities during the Chinese revolution, see, Lyman
Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in
Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1967).
21. Cheng Li, “Think National, Blame Local:
Central-Provincial Dynamics in the Hu Era,” China Leadership Monitor 17
(Winter 2006).
22. Sui-Lee Wee, “Chinese Rebel Villagers Vow March to
Press Complaints,” Reuters, 19 December 2011.
23. Mattis, “China’s Adaptive Approach to the Information
Counter-Revolution.”
24. Joseph Fewsmith, “Social Management’ as a Way of
Coping with Heightened Social Tension,” China Leadership
Monitor 36 (Winter 2012).
25. “Communist China: The Political Security
Apparatus—Part II Destruction and Reconstruction 1965–1969,” POLO Paper
No. 37, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 28 November
1969 (Declassified May 2007).
26. Peter Mattis, “Assessing the Foreign Policy
Influence of the Ministry of State Security,” Jamestown Foundation China
Brief 11, no. 1 (14 January 2011).
27. Amber Wang, “Sex Lured Taiwan General to Become
China Spy,” Agence France Presse, 9 February 2011; “TECRO Representative:
Lo Hsien-che Posted to Thailand, Not United States
[zhu mei guan yuan: luo xianzhe zhu tai fei zhu mei],” China Times
[zhongguo shibao], 9 February 2011; “Lo Hsien-che
Spies for Mainland; President Demands Thorough Investigation and
Strengthening of Protection of Secrets [luo xianzhe
she gong die; zongtong yaoqiu che cha, zuo hao mimi baowei],” China Times
[zhongguo shibao], 9 February 2011; Rich Chang,
“General Arrested, Accused of Spying,” Taipei Times, 10 February 2011.
28. Luo Tianwen, Liu Ying, Liu Shoushuo, Tan Haifeng,
and Wu Di, “Junshi qingbao gongzuozhong mubiao yaohai panding
yanjiu,” Qingbao Zazhi [Journal of Information] 29,
no. 6 (June 2010): 107–109.Analysis of Chinese Intelligence
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September
2012) 57
29. Kan Zhongguo, “Intelligence Agencies Exist in
Great Numbers, Spies Are Present Everywhere; China’s Major Intelligence
Departments Fully Exposed,” Chien Shao (Hong Kong), 1
January 2006.
30. For a useful analysis of the importance of China’s
growing military intelligence needs see, Ian Easton and Mark Stokes,
“China’s Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite
Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and Naval Operations,” Project
2049 Institute Occasional Paper, 23 February 2011.
31. For an analysis of the PLA intelligence and
foreign affairs leadership and the transition from intelligence experts to
military
operations personnel, see James Mulvenon, “The ‘Dawn
of Heaven’—A New Player in Sino-U.S. Mil-Mil,” China Leadership
Monitor, no. 24 (Spring 2008); James Mulvenon, “Ding,
Dong, The Witch is Dead!”—Foreign Policy and Military
Intelligence Assessments after the Retirement of
General Xiong Guangkai,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 17 (Winter 2006).
32. Jen-kai Liu, “China Data Supplement: The Main
National and Provincial Leadership,” Journal of Current Chinese
Affairs 19, no. 5 (2011).
33. Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry
Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,”
in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy
in the Era of Reform 1978–2000, ed. David Lampton (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2001), 50, 414.
34. For expression of these views at the highest
levels, see, for example, President Obama’s remarks in Australia, The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary “Remarks By
President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” Parliament House, Canberra,
Australia, 17 November 2011; Hillary Clinton,
“America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011.
35. Mark Stokes, Jenny Lin, and L.C. Russell Hsiao,
“The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber
Reconnaissance Infrastructure,” Occasional Paper,
Project 2049 Institute, 11 November 2011; John Pomfret, “China Finds
Bugs on Jet Equipped in U.S.; Devices Taken Off
Presidential Plane Could Become Issue at Summit,” Washington Post, 19
January 2002.
36. Mattis, “China’s Adaptive Approach to the
Information Counter-Revolution.”
37. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government
Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989),
especially pp. 14–28, 158–171; Graham Allison, Essence
of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1971), especially pp. 78–96.
38. See, Michael Handel, War, Strategy, and
Intelligence, New York: Routledge, 1989, 380–95; J.C. Masterman, The Double-
Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New York,
Ballantine Books, 1972), 1–32; Li Mingyang, ed., Sunzi Bingfa [Sun-
Tzu‘s Art of War] (Hefei, Anhui: Huangshan Shushe,
2001), 193.
39. These official linkages with Chinese intelligence
are well-known and have been thoroughly traced in the public literature,
see, Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, “Chinese
Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutions,” The China Quarterly,
No. 171 (September 2002); Bonnie Glaser and Phillip
Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving
Roles and Increasing Influence,” The China Quarterly
171 (September 2002): 599; Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations,
19; Intelligence Threat Handbook, 2004 (Interagency
OPSEC Support Staff. Alexandria, VA: Centre for
Counterintelligence and Security Studies, 2004),
72–73; DeVore, China’s Intelligence and Internal Security Forces, Sections
3–10. 40. For example, see, “China-based
Hacking of 760 Companies Shows Cyber Cold War,” Bloomberg, 13 December 2011;
Michael Joseph Gross, “Enter the Cyber-dragon,” Vanity
Fair, 1 August 2011; Josh Rogin, “The Top 10 Chinese Cyber
Attacks (That We Know Of),” Foreign Policy (22 January
2010).
41. Francesco Sisci, “Too Many Cooks Spoil
Foreign-Policy Stew,” Asia Times Online, 7 January 2011; Linda Jakobson and
Dean. Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,”
SIPRI Policy Paper, no. 26 (September 2010).
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