Political Perspective (Sino-U.S. Strategic Competition in Southeast Asia) China’s Rise and U.S. Foreign Policy

Political Perspective

(Sino-U.S. Strategic Competition in Southeast Asia)

China’s Rise and U.S. Foreign Policy   

 Abstract

Asia’s growing economic prosperity led by China’s rise in recent years has caused the spotlight of international relations to turn eastward. Along with rising interest in China’s development, renewed attention has also gravitated towards Southeast Asia, a region slighted in the general discussion of power in the international realm. With Southeast Asia’s growing role as the hub of regional integration and increasing market potential, observers are watchful on how the development of regional trade agreements in the area may shape international relations in East Asia, particularly with the realization of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area. A further concern of China’s growing relations with Southeast Asia is its impact on Sino-US relations and what it entails for the balance of power in the region. The US return to Asia under the Obama administration re-engages the lone superpower with the region and Southeast Asia is an important testing ground of US cordiality towards Asia. Current US foreign policy has departed from the Bush administration’s emphasis on anti-terrorism and seeks engagement with Southeast Asia towards the goal of balancing China’s rise. This article seeks to explain and analyze the significance of Sino-US strategic competition in Southeast Asia. Keywords: Sino-US Relations, Southeast Asia, China Rise, US foreign policy

In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security

In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security

Contents

Issues......................................................................................................................................2

Worldview ...........................................................................................................................3

Goals........................................................................................................................................4

Effects.....................................................................................................................................6

Prioritization.......................................................................................................................8

Resources..............................................................................................................................9

Assessments Summary............................................................................................................................10

Integration...............................................................................................................................Risk......................................................................................................................................11

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 13

Summary

Over the last few years, the term “partnership” has spread like wildfire through official U.S. national security guidance documents and rhetoric. At the Department of Defense (DOD), which spearheaded the proliferation of the term, “partnership” has been used to refer to a broad array of civilian as well as military activities in support of national security.1 At other U.S. government agencies, and at the White House, the use of the term “partnership” has been echoed and applied even more broadly—not only in the national security arena, but also to all facets of U.S. relationships with foreign partners. “Partnership” is not new in either theory or practice. To illustrate, U.S. strategy during the Cold War called for working with formal allies, through combined planning and the development of interoperable capabilities, in order to deter and if necessary defeat a Soviet threat. And it called for working with partners in the developing world to cultivate the allegiance of states and societies to the West, and to bolster their resistance to Soviet influence. Congress provided oversight in the forms of policy direction; resources and authorities for programs ranging from weapons sales to combined military exercises to cultural exchanges; and accountability.

New in recent years is both the profusion of the use of the term partnership and—in the aftermath of both the Cold War and the first post-9/11 decade—a much less singular focus for U.S. global engagement. Recent defense and national strategic guidance clearly conveys the view that partnership is good. But as a rule, it provides much less sense of what partnership is designed to achieve and how that protects U.S. interests; it does not clearly indicate how to prioritize among partnership activities; it does not assign specific roles and responsibilities for partnership across the U.S. government; and it does not indicate how to judge whether partnership is working

 A lack of sufficient strategic direction could raise a series of potential concerns for Congress: 1 Illustratively, these activities may include senior-level personal relationships between the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) or Combatant Command Commanders, and the Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) of other states; bilateral military exercises like the annual African Lion exercise conducted by the United States Marine Corps and the

Moroccan Royal Armed Forces; multi-lateral exercises such as NATO’s annual Combined Endeavor communications interoperability exercise involving NATO Allies and Partnership for Peace countries; inclusion of foreign military officers as students at U.S. military schools, as well as the participation of U.S. military officers as students at foreign military schools such as the National Defense University of Pakistan; pursuit of major platform interoperability, for example through the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Poland; fostering specific capabilities in a country or a given region of the world, such as the maritime capability-focused Africa Partnership Station; preparing foreign security forces to participate in multi-lateral operations, such as training Burundian battalions to support their deployment to Somalia as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); and efforts to foster more effective governance and development, for example in Afghanistan at the provincial and district levels.

 Based on recent usage, “partnership” does not appear to be equivalent to any other existing terminology. The closest analogue may be “security cooperation,” itself an umbrella term for many different programs and activities, which DOD defines as “those activities conducted with allies and friendly nations to build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests; build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.” See the website for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. While that definition appears to cast a broad net, “partnership” arguably has been used even more broadly to include potential partners that are not necessarily “friendly”, as well as goals that extend beyond relationships, capability-building and access—such as fostering shared norms, and reducing conditions conducive to the rise of transnational threats. While the term “partnership” could conceivably be defined as an umbrella for a series of specific, familiar, existing efforts, such an authoritative definition has not yet been offered.

Without sufficient national-level strategic guidance, good decisions about the use of partnership tools in support of national security may still be made on a case by-case basis. But the natural default, practitioners suggest, may be toward embracing available opportunities, building further on evident successes, and falling in on existing patterns of engagement. In effect, that approach means optimizing at the sub-systemic level—focusing on the trees rather than on the forest—which may not optimally address defense and/or national-level strategic priorities.

Without a clear articulation of the “ends” of partnership in support of national security, and whether and how those ends contribute to protecting U.S. interests, it may be difficult for agencies to judiciously prioritize partnership requirements against those for other national security missions.

Without a clear articulation of the “ways and means” of partnership in support of national security, it may be difficult for agencies to gauge the extent to which partnership capabilities are distinct from others, or alternatively constitute “lesser included” subsets of other capabilities; and it may be difficult for agencies to consider appropriately the implications of partnership requirements for shaping and sizing the military force and the civilian workforce.

Without a clear strategy of partnership in support of national security, linking ends with ways and means over time, it may be difficult for U.S. agencies to craft appropriate assessment tools to gauge the impact of partnership efforts on achieving defense and national security objectives, rather than resorting to the common default of focusing on “outputs,” such as whether or not a training event took place.

Without a clear distribution of roles and responsibilities—and corresponding resources and authorities—across the U.S. government for partnership in support of national security, it may be difficult for departments and agencies to plan and execute efficiently, and to integrate their efforts effectively.

Without a clearly stated premise regarding resourcing—one that links initial investments in partnership efforts to any expected future savings as partners assume greater responsibilities over time—it can be difficult to anticipate the budgetary implications of partnership in support of national security.

Without sufficient strategy for partnership in support of national strategy, together with appropriate assessment tools, a clear division of labor across the U.S. government, and resourcing expectations, it can be difficult for Congress to effectively allocate resources and authorities among agencies, and to ensure accountability for effective and efficient execution. Issues The debates and discussions among U.S. government officials and outside stakeholders about the use of partnership in support of national security are inchoate, but a number of facets of the debates are discernible, including worldview; goals; effects; priorities; resourcing; assessments; roles and responsibilities; and risk. These issues are variously addressed in recent strategic guidance documents. Key unclassified guidance documents include the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, and its follow-on Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) roadmap; Congressional Research Service

In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS); the 2010 QDR Report; the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR); and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG).3 In addition, a wealth of internal DOD guidance reportedly addresses partnership—in particular the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) as well as planning and programming guidance documents under their various names. Yet the treatment of “partnership” by these documents is both inconsistent and partial—not all documents address all the major facets of strategy; some, such as resourcing, are barely treated; and in many cases the thrust of the guidance has changed over time. This section describes each facet of partnership strategy, analyzes its treatment in recent guidance, and raises questions that may be germane to congressional oversight.

Worldview

In general, a state’s national security strategy is likely to derive from some worldview—a set of assumptions about the nature of the world order and the exercise of power within it, together with a view of that state’s role on the world stage. That worldview, in turn, is likely to shape how a state defines its national interests. In any partnership strategy, these starting points are likely to affect what effects are desired, how efforts are prioritized, and how results are assessed. While worldview may not be explicitly stated, identifying its influence on U.S. strategy, including the role of partnership within that strategy, may be helpful to rigorous oversight.

Recent strategic guidance documents vary significantly in both the extent to which worldview is explicitly stated, and the nature of their respective worldviews:

The 2006 QDR went to great lengths to justify the whole idea of partnership.

Partnership was depicted less as a given than as a new necessity, driven by two new realities in the global arena: the urgent threat of terrorism that required actions in new places; and the long-term, large-scale contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that required more hands. In turn, the 2006 QDR ascribed to partnership a relatively linear causal logic: the United States would help build partners’ capabilities, and then those partners would employ those capabilities in accordance with U.S. strategy. A basic—and in some ways remarkable— assumption of the 2006 QDR was that partners’ decisions and actions would largely follow U.S. intent. See Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, with140 uses of some form of “partner”; Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, “Quadrennial Defense Review Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) Execution Roadmap,” May 22, 2006; President Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, May 2010; with 120 uses of “partner”; Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, with 225 uses of “partner”; Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Leading through Civilian Power, the First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, 2010, with 347 uses of “partner”; and Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, with 27 uses of “partner”.  The results of U.S. partnership efforts, in turn, are likely to be shaped by the worldviews of all participating partners.  While in common parlance “partnership” suggests co-equal partners, that connotation may not apply to the debates about partnership in support of national security. The premise of the 2006 QDR is obviously “asymmetric” in the leading role it assigns to the U.S. government, not only for building partner capabilities but for largely determining in the first place what capabilities ought to be built and in what contexts they ought to be applied, together with its assumption that partners will indeed follow U.S. strategic intent in their application of their new capabilities. Yet the 2010 NSS is also asymmetric, in a different way, in the leadership role it assigns to the U.S. government for actively fostering shared norms with partners. The theory may vary, but the “U.S. lead role” in U.S. debates about partnership Congressional Research Service

In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security

The 2010 QDR adopted the worldview of the 2006 QDR, that partnership as a rule requires a rationale, as well as a similar view of the global security context. As a result it largely echoed the counter-terrorism (CT)-driven rationale for partnership from the 2006 QDR.

 The 2010 NSS, in contrast, is explicitly based on a worldview in which collective action in the service of common interests is taken as a given—the default way of doing business in general, and thus not an approach that needs to be justified in each case. That view, solidly echoed in the 2010 QDDR, may be contrasted with a more instrumental approach to partnership, in which specific partners are recruited, when circumstances so require, to help accomplish specific ends. Furthermore, the 2010 NSS adopts from the institutionalism school of international relations theory the premise that shared norms help shape outcomes in the international system; so part of the causal logic in the 2010 NSS is that the United States fosters shared norms through partnership efforts, and those norms in turn shape choices by other international actors.

 The 2012 DSG reflects the 2010 NSS worldview—that partnership is the default way of doing business. It also reflects a perception of the global security context that is very different from those described by the 2006 and 2010 QDRs. The DSG underscores that the large-scale contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan are no longer the top U.S. defense priorities, and the sense of urgency about fostering partners with the kinds of capabilities required for those contingencies has disappeared. The DSG’s fundamental “shift toward the future” underscores concern with a broad range of security challenges, in contrast to the almost singular focus on CT as a driver for partnership in 2006. With partnership as the default starting point, the DSG indicates that any or all of these challenges might be addressed in part through partnership. Key questions concerning worldview might include the following:

 What assumptions about the nature of the world order undergird proposed partnership initiatives?

 How powerful a role does U.S. leadership play in partnership activities—to what extent does strategy assume that partners will participate, and then act, based on U.S. intent?

 Should partnership be the default starting point for engagement on the world stage? Or does the choice to pursue partnership—given its inherent frictions and opportunity costs—require justification in each case?

What role if any do shared norms play in shaping outcomes? And to what extent if any can the U.S. government shape shared norms?

Goals

In principle, worldview and national interests shape national security strategy, which in turn articulates goals. One fundamental, unresolved tension in the debates about the use of partnership in support of national security concerns the fundamental goal of partnership. One possible logic argues that the global security context today presents a greater or more complex array of challenges than it did in the past, so partnership, including greater participation and contributions

In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security by partners, is now essential in order to meet those challenges. Another possible logic argues that partnership generates savings—as U.S. partners assume greater responsibilities, the United States can do less. Those two logics are not mutually exclusive, but different choices about their respective importance could have different implications for prioritizing and resourcing partnership efforts.

Recent strategic guidance has tended to suggest that both logics apply without clarifying their relative importance:

 In the mid-aught, both logics were powerfully alive in the Pentagon debates that shaped the 2006 QDR and other decision-making. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and amidst attention-grabbing cyber attacks, officials underscored that the 21st century presented a much broader array of security challenges than ever before. The 2006 QDR called for building international partners’ capabilities in order to meet those broader challenges. For example, counter-terrorism (CT) would require new, highly local approaches—and many of them—designed to cut off initial manifestations of terrorism, wherever in the world it might take root.

The 2006 BPC roadmap argued more pointedly that without partnership at home and abroad, “the nation’s strategic objectives are unattainable.” In other words, alone—we fail. At the same time, the 2006 BPC roadmap, more explicitly than any other guidance, also invoked the idea of savings: “The Department’s efforts to build the planning and operational capabilities of partner agencies and international partners have the potential to reduce the length of U.S. force deployments, minimize the range of circumstances in which U.S. forces are called upon, and preserve the Department’s financial resources.”7 What the roadmap did not do was square the circle by addressing how partnership could achieve savings in the face of a larger overall requirement.

 The 2010 QDR echoed the 2006 QDR’s concern with an increased span of challenges as well as its premise that partnership was an important tool for addressing them. In addition, the 2010 QDR noted one way in which partnership could generate savings—by rendering some actions unnecessary or reducing the U.S. share of the burden if action were required. By “strengthening relationships” abroad, it argued, the United States would become better at averting crises altogether or—if needed—at working with others to respond to them.

The 2012 DSG, in turn, seems to skew in the direction of savings. It states that partnership “remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership.” Also, DOD official communications associated with the DSG have frequently stressed that partnership is one pillar of its plan to mitigate risk in the context of constrained resources.96 2006 QDR, see pp.14, 22, 88. See also speeches and congressional testimony by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, in 2006 and 2007, available at http://www.defense.gov/ speeches/archive.aspx. 7 See 2006 BPC p.3, 19. 8 See 2010 QDR pp. 27-30, 57. 9 See DSG p.3, and see for example testimony by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 14, 2012.

In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security

Key questions concerning the fundamental goals of partnership might include the following:

 What is the fundamental goal of partnership in support of national security? Is the logic to save money, as U.S. investments pay off over time in terms of things the U.S. government no longer has to do? Is the logic to meet a greater array of global security challenges by working by, with, and through partners—challenges that the United States would simply not have time or resources to meet on its own?

To the extent that both goals apply—meeting challenges and generating savings—what is the appropriate balance between these goals in driving decisions about prioritization and resourcing?

Effects

In theory, partnership might be used to help achieve any of a wide array of ends that support national security: enabling partners to do specific things (at home, abroad, or as part of multilateral efforts); giving the United States better situational understanding; ensuring U.S. access; and shaping partners’ perceptions and decision-making. Moreover, many specific partnership activities may aim at multiple effects—digging a well might build local good will for further tactical-level cooperation but may also develop capabilities that host nation forces could apply at home or abroad, foster effective host nation civil-military collaboration, deepen U.S. ability to work with host nation partners on a range of issues, and/or demonstrate U.S. commitment as part of a broader, orchestrated bilateral relationship. Clearly establishing the strategic logic that links interests to desired effects, and effects to activities, is widely viewed by strategists as essential for prioritizing efforts, producing effective assessments, and providing accountability. Recent strategic guidance tends to describe desired effects omnivorously—after all, most potential effects of partnership sound desirable—without clarifying the interests-effects-activities logic trail:

The 2006 QDR and its BPC roadmap, reportedly driven by a keeping-us-up-at night view of global terrorism, were relatively specific and distinctly ambitious concerning the desired effects of partnership. The 2006 QDR helped propagate the view that effective counter-terrorism called for “going local”—countering the precursors to terrorism wherever it might take root. That approach, in turn, required working closely with interior as well as defense ministries of partners around the world. It also required a transformative approach toward state and society in partner countries: “improving states’ governance, administration, internal security and the rule of law in order to build partner governments’ legitimacy in the eyes of their own people and thereby inoculate societies against terrorism, insurgency, and non-state threats.” This 2006 view did clearly link desired effects with U.S. interests, but that list of “effects” was unwieldy, because it failed to separate the essential from the merely desirable. Particularly from a 2012 vantage point—steeped in both emerging lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, and a deeply austere fiscal context—the 2006 aspiration to Congressional Research Service

In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security “inoculate” may sound strikingly maximalist, and the view that the U.S. government can foster such inoculation, highly optimistic.10

The 2010 QDR largely echoed the CT-driven rationale for the use of partnership from the 2006 QDR, as well as its scope and high level of ambition regarding partnership’s desired effects. For example, it explained that since terrorists exploit ungoverned and under-governed areas as safe havens, DOD would help strengthen the ability of local forces to provide internal security and would work with other U.S. agencies to strengthen civilian capacity. It also made an adjustment to the strategic logic of partnership by naming “building the security capacity of partner states” as one of its six key missions. While that move may have been intended to emphasize further the importance of partnership, it opened the door to confusion by suggesting that partnership was an “end” rather than a set of instruments for pursuing other ends.

The 2010 NSS calls for the use of whole-of-government partnership approaches, including roles for a number of U.S. departments and agencies, to help achieve a wide array of desired effects in support of U.S. national security interests. In the NSS, the effects of “investing in the capacity of strong and capable partners” include everything from countering violent extremism and stopping proliferation, to helping sustain economic growth and fostering shared norms. Geographically, the NSS calls for pursuing those effects very broadly—with traditional allies, emerging centers of influence, and new partners. Whether or not the objectives are all laudable and the proposed categories of partners appropriate, the expansiveness of both categories raises questions about which effects are most essential for protecting U.S. interests.

The 2010 QDDR uses the term “partnership” to refer to the full spectrum of U.S. engagement with other states and multilateral organizations, which makes the desired effects of partnership largely coterminous with those of U.S. foreign policy. It affirms that one major component of that partnership is security-focused, and it states broadly that “the United States is investing in the capacity of strong and capable partners and working closely with those partners to advance our common security.” Within that security category, it describes a wide range of the desired effects of partnership—from improving justice sectors, to countering violent extremism, to curtailing criminal networks, to strengthening fragile states, to ending conflicts, to supporting the environment—a range that far exceeds the narrow CT focus of the 2006 and 2010 QDRs. The QDDR does not articulate how the application of partnership approaches yields specific effects, or which applications are most important for protecting U.S. interests.12

The 2012 DSG provides the least clarity, among the recent defense guidance documents, about the specific desired ends of partnership. That reflects both the worldview of the 2010 NSS, in which partnership is simply the way to do business, and the DSG’s broader-spectrum view of future security challenges compared to previous defense guidance. In stressing the importance of partnership activities including rotational deployments of U.S. forces, and 0 See 2006 QDR, p. 90. 11 See 2010 QDR, pp. 2, 27-30. 12 See 2010 QDDR p. 10, and for example p. 22. Congressional Research Service

In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security bilateral and multilateral training exercises, the DSG describes a long array of potential pay-offs including ensuring access, reinforcing deterrence, building capacity for internal and external defense, strengthening alliances, and increasing U.S. influence. But such a laundry list of desired effects does not indicate how specific activities generate specific effects, does not provide clear guidelines concerning which of the effects are most important for protecting U.S. interests, and does not convey the strategic logic, if any, by which some effects generate others.

Key questions concerning effects might include the following:

 How exactly does building the capacity and capabilities of U.S. partners lead to outcomes that help protect U.S. national security interests? By what logic exactly do partnership activities generate their desired effects?

 How and under what circumstances might some partnership effects help generate others? Prioritization Opportunities for partnership in support of national security are theoretically unbounded, so prioritization is essential both to focus effort and to conserve resources. In theory, priorities— always based on advancing and protecting U.S. interests—might be based on geography; or on functional concerns such as CT, countering weapons of mass destruction, and preventing or mitigating conflict; or on qualities of a potential partner such as its willingness to participate, its existing capabilities, and its general importance on the world stage aside from the dynamics of its bilateral relationship with the United States. These three possible rationales are likely to drive decision-making in quite different directions. It makes sense for partnership strategy to provide some mechanism for adjudicating

among and sensibly synchronizing these three sets of concerns. Published strategic guidance documents are generally short on prioritization, while internal guidance reportedly has not settled on a single approach toward prioritization:

The 2010 NSS and QDDR cast the broadest net, using “partnership” to refer to the full spectrum of U.S. government engagement around the world, providing exhaustive lists of the geographic areas ripe for partnership, the substantive arenas in which partnership should be applied, and the categories of potential partners.

 Not surprisingly, DOD’s publicly available strategy documents do not include detailed guidance for prioritizing the use of partnership. The DSG stresses the growing importance of the Asia Pacific region and the continued importance of the Middle East, but it does not cross-walk those broad geographical priorities with functional or partner-characteristic concerns. 13 In practice, even the most rigorous prioritization is likely to be tempered by some opportunism—the rationale that if a partnership opportunity arises in which a little investment appears to go a long way, why not engage?

 Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security

Reportedly, DOD’s internal guidance regarding partnership is more forthcoming, but the logic of prioritization that it uses has varied over time and the thinking remains unrefined. Some earlier guidance reportedly emphasized cultivating “willing and capable” partners. Yet some of the most important engagements from a U.S. strategic perspective may be precisely with those states that are not fully willing, or do not yet have all the capabilities required. These might include weak states facing significant internal turmoil that could grow into a threat to U.S. interests; or states that may take a skeptical view of the United States but whose geographic proximity to sources of U.S. concern could offer important access. While having willing and able partners might in theory be welcome, investing in all of them, and only in them, might not yield the biggest pay-offs in terms of protecting U.S. interests.

Reportedly, more recent internal DOD guidance has recognized multiple potential rationales for partnership beyond the simple “willing and capable” formulation. But the use of multiple rationales has led to long lists of designated partners—each designated perhaps for a different combination of reasons.14 Without an agreed mechanism for rationalizing the major logics that might drive prioritization, and without some appetite suppressant on the overall scope, such guidance may provide little basis for making tough choices. Key questions concerning prioritization might include the following:

By what mechanism should priorities for partnership be determined? How might concerns with specific geographic regions, with specific kinds of threats and challenges, and with key characteristics of potential partner states best be reconciled to produce a coherent approach to prioritization?

To what extent and in what ways should a sense of the overall requirement drive decision-making about priorities? To the extent that partnership efforts in support of national security may include states, multi-lateral organizations, non-governmental organizations, and societies writ large, how can partnership strategy best prioritize among unlike partners? Resources

The broad partnership debates often seem to assume that partnership yields savings over time. To the extent that savings is part of the desired ends, it may be helpful for partnership strategy to outline the curves of investment and expected pay-off over time, including when and how both curves will be reflected in budget requests. As a rule, strategic guidance concerning partnership broadly intimates that partnership eventually produces savings without demonstrating how that is expected to occur.

The 2006 BPC roadmap went further than other strategic guidance by recognizing a range of ways in which partnership might generate savings over 14 Interviews with DOD officials, 2012. Congressional Research Service

In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security time. It also required that DOD officials include “assessments of the fiscal impact” in future internal deliberations about partnership.15 Key questions concerning resources might include the following: To what extent, if any, does partnership, given the initial costs of investment, eventually yield savings?

In what ways, and according to what broad timeline, are savings generated by partnership efforts expected to be reflected in budget requests?

 To what extent if any does, and should, anticipated savings drive the relative prioritization of proposed partnership activities?

Assessments

One potential fundamental challenge to congressional oversight of Administration partnership efforts in support of national security is the lack of a clear assessment model for gauging the impact of partnership efforts. A common but generally unhelpful approach is to assess easily quantifiable “outputs” rather than “effects”—for example, assessing a bilateral exercise as successful because the exercise did indeed take place, rather than gauging the immediate and cumulative impact of relationship-building and capabilities-fostering on protecting U.S. interests. In theory, rigorous assessment requires as a starting point a clear and specific articulation of desired ends, together with a clear logic for assessing progress toward those ends. The realm of partnership complicates assessment in two ways. First, partnership efforts may be aimed at achieving multiple effects simultaneously—ranging from immediate, concrete results to longer-term, less tangible outcomes such as stronger U.S. influence that shapes a partner’s decision-making. Second, some effects may be achieved partially, along a spectrum, rather than in the binary terms of success or failure.

As a rule, strategic guidance regarding partnership has been vague about desired effects, and it has not addressed the balance among qualitatively different kinds of effects. If anything, guidance tends to imply, without stating so, that accomplishing a tactical-level mission will naturally also yield an array of tangible and intangible benefits at the operational and strategic levels. Assessments depend on unambiguous statements of expected results. Among the recent guidance, only the 2006 BPC roadmap explicitly recognized the need to be able to assess return on U.S. investment, but it did not outline how to do so. Key questions concerning assessments might include the following:

How can the effects of partnership efforts, and their role in protecting U.S. interests, best be assessed?

How might an assessments process consider partnership efforts designed to generate multiple, tangible and intangible, discrete effects? How in particular can the growth and impact of U.S. influence best be weighed? 15 See BPC, p. 19. Congressional Research Service

In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security

How can an assessments process best account for the fact that the effects of partnership efforts may depend in significant part on decisions and actions by U.S. partners?

What qualities must partnership strategy have in order to facilitate effective assessment? Integration Observers have suggested that in an ideal world, the U.S. government would closely integrate all of its partnership efforts in support of national security—in diplomacy, development, and defense—not only so that these efforts do not contradict each other, but also so that they actively leverage each other and, as a whole, reflect U.S. priorities. Furthermore, the U.S. government would have a clear internal division of roles and responsibilities for partnership—among departments, and among key components within departments—in order to prevent confusion, mitigate friction, and allow effective and efficient preparation and execution by each entity. That clear division of labor would be reinforced, in turn, by congressional oversight.

In general, strategic guidance tends to be strong in calling for integration of effort, though usually without prescribing mechanisms for achieving that integration; and weak in calling for, let alone clarifying, a clear division of roles and responsibilities:

At the systemic level, the 2010 NSS calls resoundingly—in a three-page section—for whole-of-government approaches, noting “we must update, balance, and integrate all the tools of American power.” It broadly describes the focus of each major component of U.S. effort—defense, diplomacy, economic, development, homeland security, and intelligence. But it does not assign roles and responsibilities to specific agencies. At DOD, the most ambitious guidance documents in this regard were those issued in 2006—the QDR and its follow-on BPC roadmap. At that time, the term “building partnership capacity” was applied ambitiously to all potential DOD partners including other U.S. agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector, as well as international partners. The 2006 guidance documents recognized the need for both integration of effort and clarification of roles and responsibilities across these stakeholders. To that end, the guidance called for the use of national security planning guidance (NSPG)—internal, classified guidance, issued by the White House to all agencies with a national security role, which would confirm specific priorities, and clarify and assign roles and responsibilities. The BPC roadmap argued in support of the NSPG proposal that if the U.S. government is at cross  purposes internally, partnership will cost more and be less effective.

The 2010 QDR echoed its predecessor in portraying close interagency integration as necessary to successful partnership. The 2010 QDR also did something singular in terms of the internal DOD division of labor on partnership matters, by calling to “strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force (GPF) capabilities for security force assistance.” Such a boost for the role of GPF might suggest the need for an updated rationalization of the respective contributions of GPF and Special Operations Forces (SOF) to partnership efforts. Congressional Research Service

In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security

Key questions concerning integration of effort and division of labor for partnership efforts in

support of national security might include the following: How can the U.S. government best establish, and refine as needed, shared overall priorities for partnership efforts in support of national security? How can it best ensure that overall priorities for partnership efforts also support U.S. foreign policy goals writ large? What is the proper distribution of roles and responsibilities for partnership in support of national security among U.S. government departments and agencies? What would be the best mechanism for regularly updating systemic-level guidance to departments and agencies about their roles in undertaking partnership efforts in support of national security? How can the U.S. government best ensure that the distribution of authorities and resources among agencies corresponds to the most appropriate division of labor?

 How can the partnership roles of all stake-holding departments and agencies, once clearly defined, best be integrated?

 Given that many different departments and agencies are likely to share responsibility for partnership in support of national security, and that many individual programs require various combinations of participation, funding, and consent from multiple agencies, how can Congress best provide effective oversight?

Risk

Many potential benefits of partnership are seemingly obvious—to the extent that they are rarely spelled out. But partnership efforts carry potential risks as well as rewards. For example, partners may, tacitly or otherwise, come to depend on U.S. assistance in lieu of fostering their own fully sustainable systems. Partners may deliberately slow their growth of capabilities, or perpetuate a negative security climate, in order to justify requests for continued assistance. Partners may accept U.S. assistance but then choose not to apply their new capabilities toward U.S. strategic objectives. Or partners may apply the skills, education, and/or weaponry gained through partnership toward ends that contradict U.S. policy, such as carrying out human rights violations and staging a coup against a legitimate government.

Key questions concerning risk might include the following: 

What safeguards are in place to help ensure that partners appropriately assumer’s possibility over time? How and to what extent can the United States best encourage partners to apply new capabilities toward achieving shared objectives?

What safeguards are in place to help ensure, at the very least, that partners do not misapply the benefits of their partnership with the United States? How much U.S. due diligence is enough to mitigate such risks? Congressional Research Ser

The United States 10 allies and 10 Enemies

The United State Top10 allies ( If you want to touch this countries ask United States First )

1. United Kingdom 
2. Canada
3. Israel 
4. Japan
5. Australia 
6. South Korea 
7. Germany
8. Poland
9. France 
10. Philippines
    
    The United States Top Enemies ( if you are closed to my Enemies that mean you are with the Terrorist
    
    1. China 
    2. Iran
    3. North Korea 
    4. Russia 
    5. Pakistan
    6. Syria 
    7. Venezuela
    8. Cuba
    9. Yemen
    10. Afghanistan 
    
     

The intelligence studies ( to be continue)

The Chinese intelligence services have balanced finding targets with access and sources able to travel back-and-forth to China. That many of these individuals were ethnically Chinese is a function more of opportunity than intent, because China-based case officers have run most known Chinese operations. Moreover, many of Beijing’s intelligence targets are, in fact, ethnically Chinese, such as Taiwan and overseas dissident groups—where foreigners are targeted, the results are cases like Boursicot’s and Glenn Shriver’s. b After the Congressional investigation into the Chinese espionage scandals of the 1990s, the committee tried to warn future analysts to be clear in their distinctions. The Cox Committee’s final report admonished, “Those unfamiliar with Chinese intelligence practices often conclude that, because intelligence services conduct clandestine operations, all clandestine operations are directed by intelligence agencies. In the case of [China], this is not always the rule.” Chinese writings on intelligence bear remarkable similarity to familiar US definitions of intelligence functions and goals. Analysis of Chinese Intelligence 50 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) excepts and methods may not be too far apart, intelligence organizations operate in the service of national policy. The needs and priorities of decision makers guide the activities of intelligence services and their operations. Beijing and Washington are engaged in dramatically different competitions that need active intelligence support. For example, counterterrorism in both countries focuses on noticeably different problems. US intelligence agencies primarily are concerned with terrorists abroad and their efforts to go operational within the United States. China, by contrast, confronts domestic terrorists that apparently have relatively fewer foreign links. The operational challenges related to collecting intelligence on these essentially different terrorist threats produce different kinds of intelligence activity. Observers should be careful not to go too far in describing the similarities between the two systems, especially given the differing cultures and ways of thinking.

1.    The Challenges Thinking of China’s intelligence services as bureaucratic organizations raises questions of what functions they serve as part of the state’s administrative apparatus and how well they perform those functions. Below, I will outline what I believe are the three principal analytic challenges to understanding the Chinese intelligence services and their relationship to the future of China and US-Chinese relations.

1. Assessing China’s Internal Security Apparatus Informed assessments of the capabilities and performance of China’s internal security system may not have direct payoffs in terms of immediate US policy goals, but they are key elements in evaluations of China’s stability—in turn a key factor in a number of US strategic interests in Asia. Analysis of China’s internal security forces is the first step toward a net assessment of the competition between China’s political reformers and its governing apparatus. While the United States may not wish to influence this contest directly, US policymakers should be aware of its progress and the viability of Chinese opposition. For at least the past 15 years, China has appeared precariously unstable; various sources have noted mounting unrest—now well over 100,000 “mass incidents” per year.11 Reports and photographs of violent demonstrations in various places have given rise to analysis that “Beijing’s control over the coercive system, as well as that system’s capacity to maintain social control, appears to be slipping.”12 Since that assertion was published in 2001, Beijing has reinvigorated its coercive apparatus. As the Chinese citizenry gained access to the Internet and mobile communications, the authorities have increased their investment in internal security. According to press reports, State Council budget figures for 2010 and 2011—even if not broken out by agency—show that the expenditures on internal security systems have outpaced the cost of China’s dramatic military modernization, coming in at $95 billion compared to $92 billion in 2010 and up to $111 billion for 2012.13 Following several years of local level experimentation with intelligence-led policing, State Councilor and Minister of Public Security (MPS) Meng Jianzhu announced the nation-wide adoption of “public security informatization” (gong’an xinxihua) at an MPS conference in 2008. “Public security informatization” refers to the process of integrating information more closely into police operations, including both domestic intelligence gathering and information management components.

On the former, the MPS directs its officers to focus on collecting information about potential social disturbances. The most well-known example of the latter is the Golden Shield project, which is primarily about linking a variety of national and

Local-level databases with personal information collected from hotels, phone companies, and other businesses that require true-name registration. This data then can be aggregated and used to generate tasking for police stations automatically when a person-of-interest turns up in that jurisdiction.14 What Beijing really appears to be aiming for is creation of the capacity to create a panoptic state, a capacity that goes beyond what normally is thought of as domestic intelligence. In the CCP’s leading journal, China’s senior leader responsible for security and stability, Zhou Yongkang, laid out the desired “social management system” (shehui guanli tixi), which he said would include integrating MPS What Beijing really appears to be aiming for is creation of the capacity to create a panoptic state. Analysis of Chinese Intelligence

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) 51 intelligence with public opinion monitoring and propaganda to shape people’s decision making about appropriate actions in the public sphere Since the publication of Zhou’s article, the MPS has launched two new efforts to change the level of its public engagement. On 27 September

2011, the MPS formally approved a nationwide policy for public security elements’ use of microblogs to spread a ministry perspective and inform Chinese citizens about safety concerns.16 In December 2011, the MPS also pushed police officers out of their stations as part of a campaign to win over the hearts and minds of the Chinese people—and to monitor public opinion.

17. The idea of information control has deep roots in Chinese strategic thought and may provide insight into how Beijing is acting on its domestic ambitions. Beginning with Sun Tzu, Chinese strategists have envisioned a seamless web of counterespionage, information collection, agent provocateurs, and propagandists—what Sun Tzu called the “divine skein.”18 Intelligence as information to support decision making is only one part of the overarching idea of achieving information superiority. For example, modern PLA strategists divided strategic information operations into multiple categories including manipulation of adversary decision making, intelligence and offensive counterintelligence, and efforts to erode or destroy an opponent’s sensors, both human and technical.

19. The question is whether these ideas permeate internal security and how far the MPS and MSS go in attempting to draw out potential dissidents—not just identifying already active subversive elements.

20. The MPS rejuvenation fits within a broader strategy of localizing grievances while preserving the legitimacy of the central government in Beijing.

21. The visible signs that this strategy is working include examples of protestors in Guangdong Province, who, despite their problem with corrupt local officials, still appealed to Beijing.

 22. The potential ability to track millions of people and register their communications would support this strategy by making it easier to follow activists and malcontents wherever they go, physically and virtually. People like the lawyers Chen Guangcheng and Gao Zhisheng, artist Ai Weiwei, and authors Chen Wei, Yu Jie, and Liu Xiaobo are dangerous because they draw attention to systemwide grievances and directly challenge the CCP’s role in perpetuating official abuse.

23. The final question about the MPS and related security offices is what is their degree of political influence. Do the internal security forces merely execute policy or are they intimately involved in its creation—and, consequently, in CCP policymaking and strategy formulation? Little open-source material other than published career information and public leadership functions—help in analyzing this question. The largely unchronicled rise of the MPS during the past decade suggests Meng and his predecessor Zhou Yongkang are largely responsible for reforming the MPS and raising the profile of “social management” and “preserving stability.” Yet despite the growing importance of the CCP’s efforts to monitor and shape an increasingly contentious Chinese society

24. nowhere can be a found a public profile of either of these two men that analyzes their impact on policy or the organizations they oversee.

25. Evolution of the Chinese Intelligence Community While analysts of Chinese intelligence activities often invoke China’s long history of espionage, the Chinese intelligence community as currently constituted is less than 30 years old. While culture matters, institutions are affected by much more—including incentives, leadership attention, and measurements of performance. Assessments of developing bureaucratic and political relationships may be difficult, even impossible, using only open-source material, but clearer understanding of them will help US intelligence and policymakers understand the conflicting interests that will shape the Chinese intelligence apparatus and its contribution to Chinese policymaking, especially as Beijing’s interests abroad grow and create new bureaucratic space and possibly greater influence for the intelligence service most able to respond to leadership needs. Since its creation in 1983, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) has The idea of information control has deep roots in Chinese strategic thought. Analysis of Chinese Intelligence

52 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) fought to carve out its operational and policy space from the Ministry of Public Security. When Beijing created the MSS, it fused the remnants of the CCP’s Investigation Department with the intelligence and counterintelligence-related components of the MPS. The first minister of state security had been a senior vice minister of public security. Thus, the MSS lacked a distinct identity, drawing as it did from several organizations that were still in the process of reconstituting from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76).

26. Recent developments suggest Beijing may be placing more emphasis on the MSS and other intelligence services to develop stronger foreign intelligence capabilities. The first sign was the selection of Geng Huichang as the new MSS chief in a ministerial shakeup in August 2007. Geng became the first minister with a foreign affairs, rather than internal security, background. He reportedly served as a professor at the MSS affiliated Beijing International Relations Institute and as a scholar, and later director, at the MSS think tank, the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.

26. A second sign is the emergence since 2008 of PRC intelligence operations conducted entirely outside of China. Until then, no exposed Chinese espionage case occurred without operational activity inside China —that is, no operation occurred without a physical connection to China. The Swedish first identified the new approach in 2008, when they uncovered Chinese intelligence officers in the Chinese embassy in Stockholm who had recruited a Uyghur émigré to spy on fellow émigrés in Europe and beyond. The Germans may have identified the second, alleging the existence of a spy ring run by a Chinese intelligence officer out of the Chinese consulate in Munich in 2009. Last year a case involved the Taiwan Army’s director of telecommunications and electronic information, who was recruited in Bangkok.

27. Understanding is also needed of the role of military intelligence (especially2PLA) in any competition for shares of the state budget and for influence within the central leadership. Chinese military modernization, especially the PLA’s development of precision-guided weaponry, has created a new need for timely tactical intelligence—targeting and data guidance, as well as information to guide bomb damage assessments, for example.28 While 2PLA has been known as “China’s

CIA,”29 the military’s need for more intelligence support would have created pressure for 2PLA to focus more on military requirements rather than national policymakers.30 Chinese policymakers—with the exception of two civilian members of the Central Military Commission —can exercise little direct influence over the PLA. Thus the PLA’s intelligence needs could lead it to monopolize intelligence resources or underinvest in capabilities that might otherwise go to meet the requirements of the central leadership. If PLA intelligence resources become more internally directed, as suggested by senior personnel appointments, 31 then Beijing may lose an alternative to the internally oriented civilian security and intelligence apparatus. A second factor to be understood is the degree to which bureaucratic inertia and the influence of the internal security elements of the Chinese intelligence and security apparatus affect developments. The civilian organizations, the MPS and MSS, report to the political-legal system (zhengfa xitong) overseen by Zhou Yongkang, who also sits on Politburo Standing Committee. His portfolio emphasizes preserving internal stability (weihu wending gongzuo)

Recent developments suggest Beijing may be placing more emphasis on the MSS and other intelligence services to develop more capable foreign intelligence capabilities. Chinese Intelligence and Security Services a Civilian Ministry of State Security (MSS)

Counterespionage and Counterintelligence; Foreign Intelligence; Domestic Intelligence Ministry of Public Security (MPS) National Police; Domestic Intelligence; Military Second Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department (2PLA) Foreign Intelligence; Defense Attaché System; Imagery Intelligence; Tactical Reconnaissance Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department (3PLA) Signals Intelligence a Other major intelligence and security departments not specifically discussed in this essay include the Fourth Department of the PLA General Staff Department (4PLA); the Liaison Office of the PLA General Political Department; the intelligence departments of the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and Second Artillery; and the State Secrecy Bureau.Analysis of Chinese Intelligence

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) 53 It is highly likely that whatever reaches the top will have been influenced and, according to the Hong Kong by local procedures and biases. press, Zhou does not sit on any of the foreign policymaking bodies, such as the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG).32 The minister of state security only gained an FALSG seat in 1998. .

33. Both civilian ministries also have substantial portions—probably the majority—of their personnel in provincial departments or local bureaus, which report to the provincial and local party committees in addition to their home ministries. Foreign affairs however are not handled at the subnational level, encouraging these local MPS and MSS units to focus on provincial, rather than national, concerns like internal stability.

3. Understanding the Chinese Intelligence Processing System If US policymakers hope to shape the way China exercises its growing influence in the world, 34 they will require clear understanding of how Chinese intelligence interprets official US statements and intelligence about the United States its services collect and evaluate. Will information the United States purposefully transmits reach China’s senior civilian and military decision makers? How it is interpreted will depend on the biases and underlying assumptions about the United States that each of the services have, subjects we know little about. Without answers to such questions the risk will be high that US statements and actions will be misinterpreted. In part the answers to such questions lie in understanding the ideological and political prisms through which Chinese officials at multiple levels view the United States. In part the answers lie in the institutional frameworks through which intelligence about the United States flows and the ways in which the Chinese manage intelligence derived from the new digital world of large data. Institutional Frameworks China, like the United States, has separate civilian and military organizations,but it also has components of national security and intelligence distributed throughout provincial and, in some cases, lower levels. This is true both for civilian ministries, which have provincial and lower level bureaus, and for PLA intelligence organizations. An excellent military example is the Third Department of the PLA’s General Staff Department (3PLA). The 3PLA—responsible for signals intelligence, computer network reconnaissance (cyber), and technical countermeasures—has offices and technical reconnaissance bureaus in each of China’s seven military regions and several major cities,

35. and it is likely that the Chinese services have their own training and procurement units in these areas. If so, it follows that regional differences in performance and equipment will exist throughout the PLA’s intelligence organizations.

36. With multiple levels between the sources of intelligence and China’s leadership, it is highly likely that whatever reaches the top will have been influenced by local procedures and biases.37 Understanding how each of China’s intelligence organizations processes reports, identifies important issues, and validates information will be key to understanding how Chinese perceptions are shaped.a 38 Even if understanding these processes does not provide the insights British signals intelligence did into German intentions, it forms the beginnings of serious assessment and awareness. A related question is to what extent are institutional and procedural biases reflected in the public writings of Chinese intelligence-affiliated analysts. Examples are the works of analysts at the military intelligence–run China Institute of International and Strategic Studies and the MSS-run China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.

 39. Are their writings useful in understanding how PLA and MSS intelligence analysts filter and interpret world events and foreign intentions? Large Data Processing The reported scale of China’s hacking activities suggests terabytes of data may be finding their way to Chinese intelligence organizations.

40. What happens to the data there remains unknown. The intricacy of China’s civilian and military security and intelligence organizations and the variety of services they are presumed to provide to a multitude of government organizations make it a Students of deception basically come to the same conclusions about what makes deception—influencing an adversary to make disadvantageous decisions by denying or supplying information—function well. Would-be deceivers need time, control over their own information, channels through which pass information, and the ability to monitor the adversary’s thinking and behavior. Analysis of Chinese Intelligence

54.Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) Ferreting out of internal, generally secret, processes may seem irrelevant to national policy or the daily diplomatic and commercial relations, but it is no less important for analysts and policymakers to understand. difficult, if not impossible, to examine solely through open sources. Key questions include how will the Chinese take on the challenge of processing vast amounts of data that human beings, even in the large numbers Chinese intelligence presumably could recruit, are unable to process. The challenge goes well beyond simple translation problems or conversion of data into searchable formats by organizations with different bureaucratic practices and jargon. How exploitation of such data adds value to Chinese leaders and policymakers is yet another question—one which Western services have probably not even begun to address, let alone resolve.

Conclusion

China’s intelligence services have long been underanalyzed as major bureaucratic organizations and components of state power. This may have mattered relatively little during China’s inward-looking and underdeveloped years. Today, its leaders are significant players on the world stage, and understanding how and what they learn about the world and how they formulate their policy choices is more important than ever. Given the complex choices the Chinese face, it is likely that their intelligence services will play an even greater role than they have in the past.

41. The intelligence and intelligence analysis challenges the Chinese face will look familiar to many US analysts:

•  Determining sources of energy and maintaining the security of delivery routes.

•  Protecting Chinese officials and citizens working abroad.

•Preserving markets for Chinese goods and defense of key supply chains, among many others. All of these interests will put pressure on the intelligence services to be more active abroad against a wide variety of targets, both official and not. How intelligence performs missions in support of these and other goals will also serve as indicators of Chinese national policy, and possibly in some cases as indicators of independent policymaking in the services. At the same time, understanding Chinese intelligence remains crucial to understanding the state of China’s internal stability, although this topic cannot be watched solely from an intelligence perspective—the pace of economic development, indications of the PLA’s loyalty to the CCP, and signs of the party’s cohesion are other keys. Recent Western misconceptions about Chinese intelligence operations and insufficient scholarly attention to intelligence organizations have limited awareness of how these institutions actually function, but, as China’s influence grows and domestic unrest continues, failure to remedy these deficiencies will be to the detriment of the United States and others with similar policy perspectives. Finally, open-source researchers are likely only to be able to establish the broad contours and systemic pressures under which Chinese intelligence operates. They may also be able to offer the questions in need of research. But much of that research involves the ferreting out of internal, generally secret, processes. That work may seem irrelevant to broad national policy or the daily blow-byblow of diplomatic and commercial relations, but it is no less important for analysts and policymakers to understand. . . .Analysis of Chinese Intelligence Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) 55 Endnotes

1. See, China’s Peaceful Development, Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, 6 September

2011.

2. Ely Ratner and Steven Weber, “American Policy toward China: Getting Beyond the Friend-or-Foe Fallacy,” New America Foundation Policy Paper, June 2011. For example, many analysts and commentators focus on the Chinese People’s LiberationArmy’s (PLA) new equipment and senior most leaders at the expense of analyzing doctrine, internal self-assessments of PLA modernization, and training exercisesthat are more critical to Beijing’s ability to use force. See, Dennis Blasko, “China in 2012: Shifting Perspectives–Assessing the PLA from the Ground Up,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 12, no. 2 (20 January 2012).

3. Christopher Andrew, “Intelligence, International Relations, and Under-Theorisation,” Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 2 (2004): 170–84; Michael Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age. (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 19–20.

4. For the three most accessible descriptions of the “mosaic,” “grains of sand,” or “human-wave” approach to intelligence collection, see David Wise, Tiger Trap: America’s Secret Spy War with China (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2011), 5–19; “Special Report: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics,” StratFor, 24 March 2010; and Howard DeVore, China’s Intelligence and Internal Security Forces (Coulsdon, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 1999). For a separate analysis of the validity of these propositions for Chinese intelligence related to the Glenn Duffie Shriver case, see, Peter Mattis, “Shriver Case Highlights Traditional Chinese Espionage,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 10, no 22 (5 November 2010).

5. The Chinese intelligence services have balanced finding targets with access and sources able to travel to and out of China. That many of these individuals are ethnic Chinese is in part of a function of the fact that most operations have been managed

by intelligence officers inside China and in part a reflection of Beijing’s concern for Chinese dissidents abroad and developments in Taiwan. See Peter Mattis, Chinese Intelligence Operations Reconsidered: Toward a New Baseline, M.A. Thesis, Georgetown University (April 2011).

6. Chen Jiugeng, “Guanyu qingbao he xinxi [Regarding Intelligence and Information],” Qingbao Zazhi (Journal of Information) 19, no. 1 (January 2000): 4–6.

7. Yan Jinzhong, Junshi qingbao xue [The Study of Military Intelligence] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2003), 12; Cheng Lei, “Qingbao yuan yu qingbao genyuan [Intelligence Sources and Intelligence’s Roots],” Tushuguan zazhi [Library Journal], No. 3 (1994), 16–18. 

8. Wise, Tiger Trap, 221–26, 238.

9. This deficiency shows in the publication record. Of the books and articles written on Chinese intelligence, only three, however minimally, examine the Chinese intelligence services as organizations and a fourth explores public security within the context of governance. For the former, see, Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations; Eftimiades, “China’s Ministry of

State Security Comes of Age in the International Arena,” Intelligence and National Security; and Devore, China’s Intelligence and Internal Security Forces. For the latter, see, Murray Scot Tanner and Eric Green, “Principals and Secret Agents: Central

Versus Local Control over Policing and Obstacles to ‘Rule of Law’ in China,” The China Quarterly no. 191 (September 2007): 644–70.

10. These differences can be explained both psychologically and philosophically, see, respectively, Richard Nisbett, The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently…And Why, (New York: The Free Press, 2003); Robert Ames and Bruce Hall, Thinking through Confucius (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987).

11. “Mass incidents” presumably refer to riots or other kinds of public demonstrations against local authorities. The last official statistics were released in 2006 and placed the number of mass incidents around 90,000. Leaked figures and Chinese scholars’ estimates range as high 180,000 per year in more recent years. See, Barbara Demick, “Protests in China over Local Grievances Surge, and Get Hearing,” Los Angeles Times, 8 October 2011; Jeremy Page, “Wave of Unrest Rocks China: Threats to Social Order Increasingly Hit Cities, Bringing Iron-Fist Response,” Wall Street Journal, 14 June 2011.Analysis of Chinese Intelligence

56 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012)

12. Murray Scot Tanner, “Cracks in the Wall: China’s Eroding Coercive State,” Current History 100, no. 647 (September

2001): 243. 13. Leslie Hook, “Beijing Raises Spending on Internal Security,” Financial Times, March 6, 2011; “China boosts domestic security spending by 11.5 pct,” Reuters, 5 March 2012. 14. Peter Mattis, “China’s Adaptive Approach to the Information Counter-Revolution,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 11, no. 10 (3 June 2011). 15. Zhou Yongkang, “Jiaqiang he chuangxin shehui guanli; jianli jianquan zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi shehui guanli tixi [Strengthen and Innovate Social Management; Construct a Sound Social Management System under Socialism with Chinese Characteristics], Qiushi [Seeking Truth], 1 May 2011. 16. “Gong’an bu: ba gong’an weibo jianshe cheng jingwu gongkai xin pingtai [MPS: Let microblog construction take police openness to a new level],” Xinhua, 27 September 2011; Liu Yang and Wu Min, “Gongkai wei xian fuwu wei ben; zunzhong junzhong shunying minyi; goujian juyou xianming tese de gong’an weibo jun [Place openness first and be service-oriented; respect the masses and heed public opinion; construct a public security microblogging group with distinct characteristics],” China Police Daily, 27 September 2011. See also, Peter Mattis, “Public Security Officially Joins the Blogosphere,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 11, no. 16 (30 September 2011).

17. Liu Xuegang, “Renmin gong’an bao kaizhan ruhe tigao qunzhong gongzuo nengli da taolun [China Police Daily reports a

great discussion over how to improve capability for mass work],” Renmin Gong’an Bao [China Police Daily], 31 January

2012.

18. Michael Warner, “The Divine Skein: Sun Tzu on Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 4 (August 2006):

483–92.

19. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 2005),

340–343; Li Yueli, “Lun junshi qingbao zuozhan [On Military Intelligence Warfare],” Qingbao Zazhi [Journal of Information]

21, No. 7 (July 2002): 99–100.

20. The idea of infiltrating potentially dissenting sectors of society continues to be present, see, Li Anjin, “Mao Zedong tongyi

zhanxian sixiang de dangdai jiazhi [The Contemporary Value of Mao Zedong’s ‘United Front’ Thinking],” Xuexi Shibao

[Study Times], 8 August 2011. For a full explanation of “united front” activities during the Chinese revolution, see, Lyman

Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press,

1967).

21. Cheng Li, “Think National, Blame Local: Central-Provincial Dynamics in the Hu Era,” China Leadership Monitor 17

(Winter 2006).

22. Sui-Lee Wee, “Chinese Rebel Villagers Vow March to Press Complaints,” Reuters, 19 December 2011.

23. Mattis, “China’s Adaptive Approach to the Information Counter-Revolution.”

24. Joseph Fewsmith, “Social Management’ as a Way of Coping with Heightened Social Tension,” China Leadership

Monitor 36 (Winter 2012).

25. “Communist China: The Political Security Apparatus—Part II Destruction and Reconstruction 1965–1969,” POLO Paper

No. 37, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 28 November 1969 (Declassified May 2007).

26. Peter Mattis, “Assessing the Foreign Policy Influence of the Ministry of State Security,” Jamestown Foundation China

Brief 11, no. 1 (14 January 2011).

27. Amber Wang, “Sex Lured Taiwan General to Become China Spy,” Agence France Presse, 9 February 2011; “TECRO Representative:

Lo Hsien-che Posted to Thailand, Not United States [zhu mei guan yuan: luo xianzhe zhu tai fei zhu mei],” China Times

[zhongguo shibao], 9 February 2011; “Lo Hsien-che Spies for Mainland; President Demands Thorough Investigation and

Strengthening of Protection of Secrets [luo xianzhe she gong die; zongtong yaoqiu che cha, zuo hao mimi baowei],” China Times

[zhongguo shibao], 9 February 2011; Rich Chang, “General Arrested, Accused of Spying,” Taipei Times, 10 February 2011.

28. Luo Tianwen, Liu Ying, Liu Shoushuo, Tan Haifeng, and Wu Di, “Junshi qingbao gongzuozhong mubiao yaohai panding

yanjiu,” Qingbao Zazhi [Journal of Information] 29, no. 6 (June 2010): 107–109.Analysis of Chinese Intelligence

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) 57

29. Kan Zhongguo, “Intelligence Agencies Exist in Great Numbers, Spies Are Present Everywhere; China’s Major Intelligence

Departments Fully Exposed,” Chien Shao (Hong Kong), 1 January 2006.

30. For a useful analysis of the importance of China’s growing military intelligence needs see, Ian Easton and Mark Stokes,

“China’s Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and Naval Operations,” Project

2049 Institute Occasional Paper, 23 February 2011.

31. For an analysis of the PLA intelligence and foreign affairs leadership and the transition from intelligence experts to military

operations personnel, see James Mulvenon, “The ‘Dawn of Heaven’—A New Player in Sino-U.S. Mil-Mil,” China Leadership

Monitor, no. 24 (Spring 2008); James Mulvenon, “Ding, Dong, The Witch is Dead!”—Foreign Policy and Military

Intelligence Assessments after the Retirement of General Xiong Guangkai,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 17 (Winter 2006).

32. Jen-kai Liu, “China Data Supplement: The Main National and Provincial Leadership,” Journal of Current Chinese

Affairs 19, no. 5 (2011).

33. Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,”

in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform 1978–2000, ed. David Lampton (Stanford, CA:

Stanford University Press, 2001), 50, 414.

34. For expression of these views at the highest levels, see, for example, President Obama’s remarks in Australia, The White

House, Office of the Press Secretary “Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” Parliament House, Canberra,

Australia, 17 November 2011; Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011.

35. Mark Stokes, Jenny Lin, and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber

Reconnaissance Infrastructure,” Occasional Paper, Project 2049 Institute, 11 November 2011; John Pomfret, “China Finds

Bugs on Jet Equipped in U.S.; Devices Taken Off Presidential Plane Could Become Issue at Summit,” Washington Post, 19

January 2002.

36. Mattis, “China’s Adaptive Approach to the Information Counter-Revolution.”

37. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989),

especially pp. 14–28, 158–171; Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1971), especially pp. 78–96.

38. See, Michael Handel, War, Strategy, and Intelligence, New York: Routledge, 1989, 380–95; J.C. Masterman, The Double-

Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New York, Ballantine Books, 1972), 1–32; Li Mingyang, ed., Sunzi Bingfa [Sun-

Tzu‘s Art of War] (Hefei, Anhui: Huangshan Shushe, 2001), 193.

39. These official linkages with Chinese intelligence are well-known and have been thoroughly traced in the public literature,

see, Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, “Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutions,” The China Quarterly,

No. 171 (September 2002); Bonnie Glaser and Phillip Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving

Roles and Increasing Influence,” The China Quarterly 171 (September 2002): 599; Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations,

19; Intelligence Threat Handbook, 2004 (Interagency OPSEC Support Staff. Alexandria, VA: Centre for

Counterintelligence and Security Studies, 2004), 72–73; DeVore, China’s Intelligence and Internal Security Forces, Sections 3–10.  40. For example, see, “China-based Hacking of 760 Companies Shows Cyber Cold War,” Bloomberg, 13 December 2011;

Michael Joseph Gross, “Enter the Cyber-dragon,” Vanity Fair, 1 August 2011; Josh Rogin, “The Top 10 Chinese Cyber

Attacks (That We Know Of),” Foreign Policy (22 January 2010).

41. Francesco Sisci, “Too Many Cooks Spoil Foreign-Policy Stew,” Asia Times Online, 7 January 2011; Linda Jakobson and

Dean. Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” SIPRI Policy Paper, no. 26 (September 2010).