The Color Revolutions posed both a foreign policy and a domestic threat to the Russian and Chinese leaderships.  Russian influence was diminished in the post-Soviet space with the emergence of pro-US regimes. The Chinese were particularly concerned with the installation of a Western oriented government in Kyrgyzstan, which they viewed 14 as a potential staging area for agents to promote unrest among Uighurs in neighboring Xinjiang province.

Both governments viewed the US goal of gaming democracy as a subterfuge for its strategic aim to expand hegemonic control, establishing subservient governments that would be amenable to its dictates.  The global nature of this enterprise indicated that both Russia and China were identified targets of regime change, although with the instruments of soft power adapted to the post-Cold War era.

 Russia retained the democratic structures instituted in the Yeltsin era, although in a modified format, including multiparty elections. The debate within the CCP about instituting democratic reforms fell far short of raising the possibility of tolerating even a loyal opposition as existed in Russia. Russia was a more open society than China, although the Putin administration displayed, at least verbally, a more hostile attitude toward a foreign presence.

 Although Russia ranked somewhat higher than China on indexes of globalization, China had a more extensive and generally constructive history of interactions with multinational corporations and international organizations. 79 Nonetheless, both were authoritarian states. The Russian and Chinese governments reacted to the Color Revolutions with the institution of preventive measures.

These differed somewhat, however, in focus and application. The Kremlin was more tolerant than the CCP of a foreign media presence, was less concerned to regulate the Internet, and adopted a relatively relaxed stance toward English language publications in Russia. Although the CCP took steps to increase surveillance and tighten controls over NGOs, the Kremlin was more proactive in its implementation of the 2006 NGO law.

The Color Revolutions had the opposite effect in China, serving to delay passage of the long anticipated revisions to the 1998 NGO regulations. In contrast to the ‘vertical of power’ exercised by the Kremlin during Putin’s second term in office, the Chinese political scene was a veritable hotbed of opposition, albeit that disagreements were largely contested within the ranks of the CCP. The Color Revolutions strengthened the hand of the Party conservatives who opposed efforts of the reformers to reduce restrictions on the operation of NGOs, as well as provide formal legitimacy to foreign NGOs. Both the Russian and Chinese press engaged in rhetorical attacks on democracy promotion, considered an instrument of regime transformation.

 Sovereign Democracy indicated the Kremlin’s attempt to introduce a variant of democracy distinct from Western practice that reflected the concrete conditions of Russia. The CCP was equally adamant that Western formulations did not correspond to Chinese needs. The first White Paper on Democracy in China, released in 2005, pointedly noted in its introductory sentences that [the] ‘democracy of a country is generated internally, not imposed by external forces,’ further asserting that China ‘must not copy any model of other countries.’80 Nonetheless, neither Russia nor China categorically rejected NGO activities earmarked for democracy promotion from abroad.

Both governments sought to supervise and regulate foreign funded projects, but they tolerated the presence of structures that were simultaneously regularly assailed as agents of imperialism. This is in contrast to the behavior of more conservative post-socialist regimes such as Belarus and Uzbekistan which have placed considerably greater restrictions on participation by external actors. Neither Russia nor China appeared especially susceptible to the Color Revolution contagion.

But both leaderships were preoccupied, if not obsessed, with the maintenance of political stability. The events of the past two decades bore witness to the 15 fragility of political systems, even those previously considered immutable. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of most of the socialist bloc was an object lesson for both regimes. In addition, the Chinese contemplated the political upheaval of the Tiananmen events which shook the CCP to its core. The Russians looked back on the Yeltsin period as a case of shattered dreams which exposed the expectation that they would rapidly enter into the ranks of Western states as a political and economic equal as an illusion. Under these circumstances, it was difficult to conceive of a predicable future; constant vigilance was a necessity. As Zhen Xiaoying acknowledged in her 2005 article on Color Revolutions, although the Chinese political system was strong, it was not as secure as people commonly thought.81 Russian citizens, for their part, apparently felt that the state was at risk: 42 percent of the respondents in a poll conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in July 2005 indicated that events similar to the Color Revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan could occur in Russia.82 The Color Revolutions posed a particular challenge to the Kremlin, revealing the susceptibility of the electoral process to outside manipulation.

 On the face of it, the heavy-handed tactics of the Kremlin against a marginalized and unpopular opposition in the 2007 parliamentary and 2008 presidential elections seem irrational. But this behavior is explicable in the context of the administration’s fear that the West could join forces with liberal voices to capitalize on latent citizen dissatisfactions against the regime.83 The Color Revolutions highlighted the inherent tensions in the policy choices of the Russian and Chinese governments.

The two states are on a road of transition but they do not want the end point to be the liberal ideal described in Francis Fukuyama’s end of history.84 State sovereignty and non-interference in China’s internal affairs has long been a mantra of the CCP. The Kremlin’s introduction of Sovereign Democracy in the second Putin administration reaffirmed these principles as a key component of Russia’s interaction with external actors.

The Color Revolutions were perceived as a threat to state sovereignty, which involved the presence of outside forces setting an agenda for political change. Inasmuch as its sponsors intended democracy promotion as a transformative mission, it was inevitably a challenge to the Russian and Chinese leaderships. Democracy promotion as an inherently altruistic endeavor, a reflection of Wilsonian idealism, simultaneously coexisted with a more realist impulse that was immediately recognized by the Kremlin and the CCP.

The installation of democratic regimes was considered to serve the geostrategic interests of the United States and its allies. Western scholarship has largely conceived of the development of civil society as a precursor to liberal democracy, a view that has also been adopted by Western governments.

 As Bruce Dickson has noted, the rise of civil society was seen as pivotal in the collapse of socialist regimes in 1989.85 This perspective, which underscores the logic of democracy promotion efforts, assumes the emergence of group interests that will be antagonistic to and challenge the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. In contrast, the Russian and Chinese governments have staked their acceptance of a private space for citizen participation on the premise that group input will not be critical of the state but can become a co-opted valuable ally.

This view bears some of the footprint of the socialist past, both in the Maoist explication of the ‘mass line’ and the Leninist notion of mass organizations as transmission belts for the articulation of Party and group interests. 16 But it differs in that the space between the political organs of supervision and private structures is at present much greater.

Civil society, albeit in an adapted paternalistic format, is considered an objective demand of the capitalism system. The conundrum facing the Russian and Chinese governments is that strict restraints on the development of civil society threaten further economic development, a fundamental pillar of regime legitimacy. But opening up the political system poses its own risks, including the possibility that it could unleash societal forces that exceed the boundaries of state control, providing an opportunity for outside actors to promote regime change.