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Chinese Economic Statecraft and the Political Economy of Asian Security
Chinese Economic Statecraft and the
Political Economy of Asian Security
China’s
rise is expected to re-shape Asian security in at least two ways. First,
economic growth will fund the development of national military power. China’s
rising prosperity makes it possible for the government to devote more resources
to all of its domestic programs, including spending on military modernization,
which rose throughout the 1990s. Moreover, trade, investment, and technology
provided by the United States, Japan, and Europe could make China militarily
more powerful than it would otherwise be. Foreign investment—total utilized
investment totaled US$61 billion in 2004—and a positive trade balance allows
China to accumulate significant foreign reserves (over $700 billion as of
2004), some of which has been used to purchase advanced weapon systems from
Russia, Israel, and other foreign suppliers.
Senator
Paul Sarbanes may have summed the argument up best: “It is difficult to escape
the conclusion that the large bilateral trade surplus that China runs with the
United States is used, at least in part, to bolster and support the Chinese
military establishment.”
Second, China is expected to use its new
diplomatic and economic power to influence the regional security order. As the
Chinese economy continues to develop, the countries of the region are becoming
increasingly dependent on China for trade and investment. Growing trade ties
have expanded Beijing’s political and diplomatic influence. Although Washington
still plays a large role in the region, changing trade patterns might in the
future marginalize the United States as an economic and political partner.
Without a strong Japan to act as a counterweight, the countries of Southeast
Asia might become more dependent on trade ties to China and thus more sensitive
to PRC preferences. Similarly, in Northeast Asia, Korea might distance itself
from the United States. Even Japan may decide that it is unwilling or unable to
balance against China’s rising power. A political shift toward Beijing could
deprive the United States of the regional allies and access to bases required
to pursue American security objectives.
Much
of the literature on the political economy of Asian security has focused on
China’s economic growth, regionalism and economic interdependence, and how
these trends either increase or dampen the possibility of military conflict. While
these developments define the environment in which the regional actors
interact, the focus of this chapter is China’s attempts to coordinate the
building of national military power with the use of influence through economic
statecraft—the employment of economics as an instrument of power.
The
central argument of this chapter is that for Beijing there currently is an
overlap between security and economic concerns. In most assumptions of realist
political economy, states sacrifice short and medium term economic gains for
security benefits. Power wins out over plenty. By contrast, liberal
institutional approaches suggest that the pursuit of economic objectives (and
participation in multilateral institutions) may eventually moderate or modify a
state’s security objectives. The increased interaction that accompanies trade
and foreign direct investment encourages communication, fosters cooperation,
and promotes a more collective sense of security.
In
addition, since conflict risks jeopardizing very real gains from trade, public
officials and private businesses dependent on trade have a strong interest in
maintaining stable relations. In the case of China, Papayoanou and Kastner
argue that engagement “empowers more cooperative economic internationalists in
China.”
Beijing
at present does not have to choose between strategic and economic objectives,
and so can pursue both power and plenty. China’s security concerns are
addressed by closer economic relations with its neighbors. Conversely, the
pursuit of economic goals does not mean that Beijing has abandoned or modified
its security objectives, or that it is necessarily any less likely to employ military
or other coercive measures to achieve core strategic goals, especially in the
case of a potential Taiwan conflict. Focused on domestic issues—economic
growth, regime stability, and leadership succession—the Chinese government’s
primary foreign policy goal is creating the stable international environment
necessary to address these challenges at home. For China,
the central objective is fostering a peaceful international environment that
lacks a balancing coalition. Beijing’s promotion of regional multilateral
institutions, its offer to enter into free trade agreements with ASEAN ,and its
promotion of direct investment in regional economies all have both a strategic
and an economic logic. They foster economic development while lowering
suspicion in neighboring countries about China’s growing power, making it more
difficult for the United States and its allies to contain Beijing.
This
overlap between economic and security objectives—what some observers call
“enlightened self interest”—raises two interrelated questions. First, will
Beijing have the necessary institutional, political, and economic capacity to
maintain the unity between “high” and “low” politics, between security and
foreign economic policy? In the near to mid term, it will not be easy to maintain
a coherent economic and security strategy. A unified vision must be maintained
within the leadership core, and the central leadership must have the ability to
insulate the policy from economic and political disruptions, as well as
compensate losers within the domestic economy.
Second,
even if Beijing has the ability, will it have the desire to continue to
coordinate economic and political objectives? Once Beijing attains what it sees
as an adequate level of power and stability, could it simply decide that there
are goals that could best be achieved through swift military action? Simple
self interest would replace “enlightened” self interest. Or are there political
crises that could abruptly end Beijing’s reliance on diplomacy, influence, and
other instruments of soft power? Beijing has made it clear that it will
sacrifice immediate economic gains if core security interests are threatened,
at either a domestic or regional level and especially in the case of Taiwan.
There may also be pushback from China’s neighbors—they may be less willing to
accept assurances from China that economic ties do in fact offer reassurances
about Beijing’s peaceful intentions. Although China is now Japan’s largest
trade partner, and Japanese investment in China is at record levels, China and
Japan have recently clashed over control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the
portrayal of history in textbooks, the incursion of a PLA Navy submarine into
Japanese waters, continued visits to Yakusuni shrine, new National Defense
Program Guidelines highlighting China’s military modernization, and a joint
U.S.-Japan declaration on Taiwan. Despite close economic ties, Korea and China
recently clashed over the historical lineage of the Goguryeo Dynasty.
This
chapter is divided into three parts. The first looks at the dominant
descriptions of economic statecraft and how they might be applied to China. The
second section introduces some of the economic, political, and strategic
factors that might result in a greater degree of distance between economic and
security policies. Currently Beijing’s pursuit of “enlightened self interest”
is rooted in two perceptions: 1) trends across the Strait are moving in a
positive direction (the forces of independence are losing ground; Chinese is
increasing its military power; the United States is playing a constructive role
in reining in the Chen administration); and 2) that the United States will
continue to be the preponderant power for the next several decades. Shifts in
either or both of these views among Chinese policymakers could result in the
replacement of influence by coercion. The final section suggests what Beijing’s
economic statecraft means for regional security and for the United States.
Currently, China’s active engagement in the region serves a number of American
interests. But over the longer term, this more positive outcome is only
possible if the United States is broadly engaged in the region.
China and Economic Statecraft
Coercion
and Influence
Much
policy analysis of China’s potential economic statecraft draws heavily on
Albert Hirschman’s discussion of foreign trade as an instrument of national
power.8 In National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, Hirschman uses
Nazi Germany’s trade relations to illustrate how asymmetric trade relations
create political gains for the larger state. Since trade makes up a smaller
percentage of the larger nation’s total trade and may make up to 50 percent of
the smaller state’s total, threats of interruption affect smaller states
disproportionately. Implicit or explicit threats to break commercial relations
thus give the larger state coercive power. In Hirschman’s view, the ability to
threaten to interrupt trade with another state is “an effective weapon in the
struggle for power.”
In addition to coercive power, as Abdelal and
Kirshner note, Hirschman also describes an influence effect.10 Commerce affects
the domestic politics in the smaller state, shaping politics and definitions of
national interest. Firms and sectors form political coalitions, create vested
interests in target states, and reshape governmental policies in different ways
than if they had been affected by domestic pressures alone.11 This happens in
all economic relations, but it is especially true in asymmetric relations where
the effects are visible and almost wholly found in the smaller country in the
trade relationship.
The
mainland’s economic policy toward Taiwan best exemplifies the political
relationships—and the uses of coercion and influence—that Hirschman describes.
China displaced the United States as Taiwan’s largest export market in 2001; in
2004, 37% of Taiwan’s total exports where to Mainland China, Macao and Hong
Kong. Taiwan sent 25% of its total exports to China in 2001, and accepted 7.3%
of its total imports from China. In 2004, exports to China had increased to
36%, while imports from China increased to 11%. China plays a similarly large
role in shares of Taiwan’s outward foreign direct investment. In 2003, Taiwan
invested $5.68 billion abroad, $3.38 billion of that in China- making China the
recipient of 59.5% of Taiwan’s total FDI. In 2003 cumulative Taiwanese
investment in China totaled more than $24.72 billion.12
From
the beginning of economic contact between the two sides, Chinese policy makers
have had a clear view of the political objectives of cross-strait trade. As an
internal 1990
Chinese
document explained, expanding trade with Taiwan would break through the “three
no’s” policy, contain separatist trends, and help “interest groups involved
closely with the mainland emerge in Taiwan’s politics in the future and
facilitate peaceful unification.”13 Chinese President Yang Shangkun noted at a
December 1990 National Conference on Taiwan Work that the “emphasis should be
placed on economic and other exchanges in order to use business to press
politics (yi shang wei zheng) and use the public to pressure the official (yi
min bi guan).”
Taiwanese politicians have been equally clear
about how they perceive the politics of economic integration. Under former
President Lee Teng-hui, the Taiwanese government refused to negotiate the
opening of the “three links” (trade, transport, communication between China and
Taiwan) and limited exchange through conservative policy of investment, jieji
yongren (no haste, be patient). The Chen Shui-bian administration replaced “no
haste” with jiji kaifang, youxiao guanli (active opening, effective management)
and opened the three “mini links”15 but has placed a ceiling on Taiwanese
investments on the mainland, proposed a “national technology protection law” to
regulate the flow of high tech products, and attempted to lure Taiwanese- and
foreign-invested firms back to Taiwan by offering preferential tax exemptions
and other incentives. Taiwan has tried to reduce its dependence on China by promoting
investment in Southeast Asia (the “go south” policy) and by calling for the
creation of free trade agreements with the United States and Japan. Speaking
to a group of Taiwanese businessmen in July 2002,
President
Chen Shui-bian warned that Taiwan should not become too reliant on the Chinese
market: “It’s good to create fortunes overseas, however, Taiwan’s national
security should be considered a priority and the public interest must be put
first. We should not have any illusions about seeking peace by stooping to
compromise with China. If our country is not secure, making more money does not
mean anything.”
From
the beginning of renewed trade, China has attempted to use the Taiwanese
business community to influence policy, especially to push for the three links.
Members of the KMT, People’s First Party, and Chamber of Taiwan Businessmen in
China have been invited to meet with central leaders in Beijing to facilitate
political and business exchanges across the strait.
Faced
with the Chen administration’s refusal to negotiate over the three links, Chen
Yunlin, director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, proposed in 2002 that Taiwan
send business leaders, preferably tycoon Wang Yung-ching and food baron Kao
Chin-yen, to negotiate the issue of direct transport, postal and trade links.
The head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council Tsai Ing-wen responded that China
cannot “appoint people on our behalf” but it is clear that flexibility by China
plays into the hands of Taiwanese business. In April 2005 China hosted a visit
by KMT Party Chairman Lien Chan, followed in May by People First Party Chairman
James Soong.
China
has also tried to drive a wedge between the business community and Chen.
Several papers in Hong Kong sympathetic to the mainland ran editorials in 2002
that emphasized how Chen Shui-bian’s agenda is to “cheat Taiwan businessmen.”
One noted that Chen Shuibian’s refusal to establish direct links is “making the
business circles…in Taiwan feel greatly indignant.”Always lurking behind the
attempts at influence was the threat of economic coercion, although it played a
largely supporting role in Beijing’s overall strategy from the 1980s to the mid
1990s. During the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis China sent its message through
military exercises and public pronouncements harshly criticizing Lee Teng-hui
and other “separatist” influences, not through economic policy. Political
coercion, however, had severe economic costs. For example, during the second
half of 1995, the Taipei stock market dropped 20%, and the New Taiwan Dollar
depreciated 10%. Taiwan’s Central Economic Research Institute estimated that
the 1995 tensions cost Taipei NT$23.7 billion to stabilize foreign exchange
markets and restore public confidence.21 The political efficacy of the measures
was mixed. On one hand, the threats imposed huge costs on Beijing’s friends in
the business community. On the other, it successfully demonstrated the
fragility of the economy and the need for good relations across the Strait to
Taiwan’s populace.
In the run-up to and in the immediate
aftermath of the 1999 Taiwanese elections, economic coercion played a larger
role in Beijing’s strategy, but in a targeted, directed manner. A message was
sent to specific business with strong political ties to Chen Shui-bian, the
DPP, or others seen to “favor independence.” On March 16, two days before the
presidential elections, Vice Chairman of Association for Relations Across the
Taiwan Straits Tang Shubei stated that if the “forces of Taiwanese independence
won,” economic relations between the two sides would be seriously impaired. As
a result, the stock market fell 4.5%, and the Taiwanese government injected
NT$1.5 billion; by mid-March, the Taiwanese government was estimated to have
spent NT$3.4 billion to shore up the Taipei index.
Economic
pressure continued after the election. Li Bingcai, deputy director of China’s
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and Taiwan Work Office of the
Central Committee of the CCP, stated that Taiwan’s industrial and commercial
leaders would not be allowed to advocate the “Lee Teng-hui line” while engaging
in business and economic operations in China.23 Beijing warned that individual
Taiwanese companies could be barred from business if they promoted
independence.
After
Chen Shui-bian assumed Taiwan’s presidency, his ties with ACER president Stan
Shih may have exposed ACER to harassment on the mainland. Acer products
apparently disappeared from the shelves of many stores and the company was more
or less forced to introduce a new brand name to sell its products. During the
dispute, Shih made a trip to Beijing to restate his support for reunification.
Taiwanese
businesses with strong links to either the DPP or Chen Shui-bian faced similar
concerns in 2001. For example, SOEs were ordered not to do business with the
petroleum conglomerate Chi Mei Group, whose PRC operations faced constant
scrutiny from zealous tax inspectors.25 In response to a question about Hsu
Wen-lung, chairman of Chi Mei and the first leading businessmen to support Chen
Shui-bian’s presidential campaign, the head of MOFERT Shi Guangsheng declared
“We will not allow Taiwanese businessmen to make political capital at home by
supporting independence and make economic profits in the mainland.”
The
pattern of coercion suggests a limited sanction policy directed at those with
close ties to Chen and the DPP and those who have actively engaged in political
support for independence. In fact, Chinese leaders tried to reassure the
majority of Taiwanese businesses that they would not be affected. In December
2002, for example, Vice Premier Qian Qichen traveled around Guangdong
inspecting Taiwan-invested enterprises and holding meetings with Taiwan
businesspeople to discuss cross-strait trade. In his conversations, Qian stated
that “In the last decade, exchange across the strait, especially economic
exchange, has seen very great progress. Under any circumstances, the mainland’s
policy of welcoming Taiwan compatriots to carry out economic activities on the
mainland will not change, and so Taiwan compatriots can completely feel
assured.”
Trade and Power
Trade
and investment are essential elements of power politics, strengthening ties
among countries that have similar defense and military orientations. Because
trade creates security externalities—trade releases economic resources for
potential military use—adherence to a policy of free trade may not make the
most sense in an anarchic system. Rather, trade should be used to bind
potential allies closer together, and free trade is more likely to emerge
across political-military alliances.
China
is not creating an alliance system in Asia, but Beijing does use commercial
relations to bolster the position of its friends. During the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia, China provided guns, tanks, armored personnel carriers,
and antiaircraft guns to Thailand at “friendship” prices. In the 1980s, China
and Thailand signed a “Strategic Partnership” arrangement, which has included a
regular exchange of military personnel and exercises. Today, Cambodia and
Myanmar both receive economic and military assistance from Beijing. In 1999,
Cambodia
obtained $18.3 million in foreign assistance guarantees and $200 million in
no-interest loans for infrastructure projects. China has supplied substantial
official development assistance to Myanmar with much of it going to improve the
road system in the upper reaches of the country and to support the building of
a navigable waterway down the Irawaddy River, projects which could have
commercial and possibly military applications. In addition, Beijing is the
major supplier of arms to the Burmese regime—some estimates of the value of the
supplies exceed $2 billion.
For
the majority of the countries in East Asia, China’s increasing economic and
political standing in the region creates a new type of influence—the need to
consult with Beijing before making major decisions. US naval officials report
that requests to increase port calls to Vietnam from one to two a year are met
with the response: “we must first gauge reaction in China.” Across issue areas,
according to Abdul Razak Baginda, “there is now this feeling that we have to
consult the Chinese. We have to accept some degree of Chinese leadership,
particularly in light of the lack of leadership elsewhere.”
In
addition, China may use trade policy to indicate intentions, signal
commitments, or project overall foreign policy orientations.30 Besides the
economic benefits that may accrue from any future cooperation, China’s recent
push for a free trade agreement with ASEAN sends a number of important
messages: China is now a status quo power in Asia, more engaged in multilateral
diplomacy, supportive of free trade, and committed to the development of the
region.
Goldstein
argues that the decision not to devalue the yuan during the Asian financial
crisis in 1997 reflected in part Beijing’s desire to substitute the image of a
responsible power for its reputation as an “irredentist, revisionist, rising
power” that it was acquiring in 1995-1996.
Furthermore,
as Frost argues in this volume, “Intra-Asian FTAs [free trade agreement] in
particular have assumed a role akin to that of security alliances, serving as
an expression of political and security ties as well as a harbinger of trade
and investment. FTAs do not affect the military balance of power, but they
alter and redefine the balance of influence, perceptions of security, and new
political alignments.” Frost notes that trade negotiations and FTAs in
particular open new avenues for influence throughout the region.
How Successful Can Economic Statecraft Be?
Despite
Beijing’s widespread efforts to cultivate political sway through economic
relations, converting trade and investment into influence is not a simple
linear process. Beijing’s attempts to build regional influence appear to depend
on the size and level of development in its own market, the nature of the
interests (regional, sub-regional, global) at stake, and the degree of threat
the smaller economies perceive in China’s rise.
In
the case of trade, a large, developing economy may be less able to exert
influence in the region than a large developed nation (such as Japan or the
United States). Pursuing political objectives at the cost of shorter-term
economic goals requires a fairly stable and mature economy as well as the
ability to balance the demands of competing domestic interests. Serious
economic dislocation would put pressure on Beijing to adjust trade or
investment patterns, undermining the political coherence of economic and
security policies. Faced with rising unemployment and social instability,
Beijing may be less willing to run trade deficits with and open domestic
markets to its neighbors. Even in the absence of a serious downturn, the center
would have to be able to compensate the industrial sectors or geographical
regions that lost as a result of trade concessions made in pursuit of political
goals.
Beijing
will also have to convince its trading partners that it can follow through and
implement its trade commitments. Without political transparency and
accountability, China’s proposals on trade risk becoming good public relations
with little substance.33 The highly touted China-ASEAN free trade pact signed
in November 2004 is an example. Close observers note that the more than 100
exceptions in the agreement, which would eliminate tariffs between China and
the members of ASEAN by 2015, render it far less substantial than has been
advertised.
There
may also be a mismatch between what the Chinese economy can offer and what
other developing economies need. The Chinese and Southeast Asian economies may
be competitive rather than complementary. The rather widespread belief that the
FDI available to the region has been largely diverted to China is not,
according to the Ravenhill chapter in this volume, supported by the data.
Ravenhill argues that “diversion” of FDI to China is almost certainly
overstated, and fails “to take into account the substantial ‘round-tripping’ of
mainland funds in China’s FDI inflows, and peculiarities in China's reporting
of inward FDI.” On the trade side, however, while Beijing portrays itself as a
new export market, Chinese goods could flood global export markets at the
expense of the region’s smaller or less developed members (and to some degree,
already are). Ravenhill’s chapter, for example, shows ASEAN producers losing
market shares and value in office machinery, footwear, apparel and clothing and
electrical machinery.
Strong
economic ties may also coexist with strained political relations, diminishing
Beijing’s ability to influence domestic politics in the target state. Here my
analytical framework differs from that applied by Robert Ross in his chapter in
this volume. For Ross, the response of states along China’s periphery is
essentially explained by the balance of power and geography.
Over
the last decade, China has greatly improved its ability to project power across
land borders against smaller countries. As a result, Thailand, Vietnam, and
Korea have essentially accepted the conclusion that they will not be able to balance
against China and have so realigned their politics toward Beijing. States that
can rely on the ocean to provide defense in depth have more leeway since PLA
power projection capabilities remain limited, especially over the sea.
Although
the Strait separates China from Taiwan, 700 short-range missiles and a growing
fleet of destroyers and attack submarines makes Taiwan’s future more like that
of Korea and other countries with land borders than maritime Southeast Asia.
In this chapter, domestic politics and
national identity play a larger explanatory role. Geography is a constant and
defining condition, but it is important to remember that exerting influence is
a political process that requires domestic mediators. Beijing’s influence is in
the end expressed through military threat and domestic politics in the target
states. These politics help define the threat and are contingent; they can be
remade by shifting alliances within the target state. In the case of China’s
bilateral relations, political battles over national identity and history can
have a large impact on the perception of threat.
In
2004, China replaced the United States as Japan’s top trade partner, with total
trade of US$167.9 billion. Japanese investment in China totaled almost $5.5 billion.
But even as the two economies grow increasingly interdependent, analysts
characterize the current bifurcation of Sino-Japanese relations as “cold
politics; hot economics.”34 In the recent past, Tokyo and Beijing have clashed
over the exploration of natural gas in the East China Sea, the presence of a
Chinese submarine off Okinawa, Japanese politicians’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine,
the granting of a visa to Lee Teng-Hui, the new National Defense Program
Guideline which specifically refers to a threat from China, and a joint
US-Japan declaration identifying stability in the Taiwan Strait as a common
strategic objective.
The
trick for Beijing (and in some part Tokyo) is to balance nationalist public
sentiment—feelings that are often nurtured by government propaganda—with the
need to maintain stable economic relations. In the past, Saunders and Downs
argue, China’s “government proved willing to incur significant damage to its
nationalist credentials by following restrained policies and cooperating with
the Japanese government to prevent the territorial disputes from harming
bilateral relations.” Chinese leaders were relatively successful in preventing
anti-Japanese nationalism from influencing foreign policy decisions in the
1980s and 1990s. The April 2005 protests against Japanese textbooks as well as
subsequent attack on the Japanese embassy and commercial entities in Beijing,
Shanghai, Chengdu, Shenzhen, and Chongqing certainly suggest that technological
and generational change may be weakening the ability, or willingness, of
Chinese leaders to insulate these decisions from public opinion As a result of
the protests, the percentage of Japan’s population holding positive views of
China has decreased dramatically, as has the influence of the “China school” in
the foreign ministry. Japan’s pursuit of “normal nation” status,a goal that
seems to be held across party lines, is
likely to promote continued friction.
Although
nowhere close to reaching the level of vitriol in the Sino-Japanese relations,
Sino-Korean relations have also lost some of their sheen. Since normalization
of relations between Seoul and Beijing in 1992, commercial relations exploded,
and China passed the United States as South Korea’s number one trade partner
and investment destination in 2003. For much of the 1990s, Korea was swept by
“China fever”; Chinatowns emerged in cities throughout South Korea, language
schools reported surging demand for Chinese lessons, and South Korean students
came to dominate classrooms in Chinese language programs at the top Chinese
universities. Many analysts were surprised when former president Kim Dae Jung
referred to the “special relationship” between South Korea and China, an
expression usually reserved for Seoul’s ties with Washington. While differences
between the United States and South Korea over the handling of the North Korean
nuclear program are helping push Seoul closer to Beijing, Korea’s desire to
benefit from the opening of the Chinese markets is also playing a role.
Even
though there is optimism about export opportunities to China, Korean producers
are increasingly worried about competition from low cost Chinese manufacturers
and the hollowing out of Korean industry. If the rate of growth in bilateral
trade slows, it will become more difficult to ignore potential trade conflict.
Scott Snyder argues that with the loss of momentum in the economic
relationship, “there will also be less excuse to gloss over political disputes
between South Korea and China over refugees, historical issues, or other disagreements
in the relationship.”38 China’s claim to the ancient Goguryeo Kingdom in 2004
appears to have cooled some of the fervor that gripped South Korea, injecting a
greater degree of suspicion into South Korean thinking about China’s motives
and methods.
The
degree of threat perceived by the smaller actor plays a large, and perhaps the
defining, role in determining Beijing’s success in actually converting
asymmetric trade relations into political influence. The Chinese have been
unable to convert economic dependence into political influence in Taiwan.
Increased trade clearly created interest groups in Taiwan who pushed for even
greater economic integration. From the first business people who funneled money
illegally through Hong Kong to invest on the mainland to the industrial leaders
claiming to be too restricted by the “Go Slow, Be Patient” policy, Taiwanese
businesses have continually pushed the pace of economic integration. For
example, in a 1998 survey 70% of Taiwanese businesses had investments in China,
and 50% hoped for greater relaxation of restrictions on investments. Industries
with direct interest in the trade such as shipping lines and computer
manufacturers have taken the lead in the campaign for cross strait shipping
ties. Taiwan Semiconductor chairman Morris Chang, for example, protested
against the Taiwanese government’s “blatant interference” in investments on the
mainland. Yet, for the most part, these organized interests have pushed for
greater economic, not political, integration. There have been some limited
cases of calls for political concessions, but these remain at the margins.40 In
the end, it appears that economic integration has polarized
Taiwanese
domestic politics, creating one pole around Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, and another
around the business community. Chen Ming-Chi argues that economic losers in
cross-strait integration tend to be concentrated in central and southern Taiwan
and that these groups tend to identify with the DPP.41 In addition, the more
dependent the economy has become on the mainland and the greater perceived
vulnerability of Taiwan to China, the greater the political pressure on Chen to
expand and tighten ties with the United States and to continue to promote the
development of a separate Taiwanese national identity. The larger problem is
that the goal Beijing is trying to achieve through influence— essentially to
convince the Taiwanese to give up de facto sovereignty—appears incompatible
with the use of threat. Since the mid-1990s, one of the central goals of
military modernization has been to pose a credible threat to Taiwan in order to
influence Taiwan’s choices about its political future; or, failing that, to
prevent Taiwan from achieving political independence.42 The most visible sign
of this coercive ability has been the deployment of over 700 short-range
missiles opposite Taiwan. In addition, China’s arsenal includes major weapon
systems purchases from Russia like the Kilo-class submarine, Sovremenny-class
destroyer, and SU-27 and Su-30 aircraft as well as the comprehensive
transformation of PLA tactics, doctrine and training. Beijing has also adopted
an increasingly inflexible position toward Taiwan, defining sovereignty
narrowly and rejecting any diplomatic space for Taiwan in international institutions
like the World Health Organization. In this political context, the objects of
influence—the business associations and the “pan Blue” coalition (the coalition
among the KMT, People’s First Party and the New Party more willing to accept
the status quo across the Strait) —have little political room to maneuver.
Beijing’s threats de-legitimize accommodation with Beijing— concrete
suggestions about working with the mainland take the cast of selling Taiwan
out.
How Long will Beijing’s Interest in Economic
Statecraft Last?
Beijing’s
commitment to economic statecraft and to the uses of influence in particular
will continue only as long as the policy is seen to be effective. China could
quickly shift its emphasis to coercion if Taiwan crosses one of Beijing’s “red
lines” in a move toward formal independence. Under such circumstances, the high
economic costs of military conflict—in the disruption of trade and investment
as well as possible sanctions from the United States, Japan, and the European
Union—might not persuade China’s leaders to maintain the current emphasis on
international cooperation. Chinese scholars note that Beijing came to
Pyongyang’s assistance during the Korean War, facing a much more
technologically advanced enemy while it was still engaging in economic
reconstruction after the end of World War II and the civil war. “If China could
make such huge national sacrifice at the cost of national construction to aid
another country, then it will definitely go to war to achieve territorial integrity
and national reunification.”
The
balance between influence and coercion is already a source of debate in
Beijing.
Some
analysts have argued that the focus on economic integration may have in part
convinced Taiwanese politicians to pursue separatist policies more
aggressively. Taiwan has moved closer to independence “not because the response
was too strong but rather because the response was insufficiently strong.” The
focus on peaceful reunification and economic integration reduced the
credibility of Chinese deterrence. To prevent further erosion of China’s
current position,
Beijing
must make Taiwan, and the United States, recognize that it is “willing to pay
any price” to contain Taiwanese independence. The pursuit of influence and
attempts to reassure neighbors is also based in a particular view of Sino-US
relations. In the late 1990s, Chinese foreign policy analysts and policymakers
began to believe that US preponderance was likely to continue at least for the
next several decades. Belligerence toward the United States, and toward the
region as a whole, was counterproductive. 45 At the 16th Party Congress in
November 2002 Jiang Zemin described the first twenty years of the 21st century
as a “period of important strategic opportunity,” a period during which Beijing
could cooperate with other powers. Hu and Wen have continued this policy line,
working to establish long term stable relations with the United States that
will be conducive to China’s modernization drive.
A
breakdown in this consensus view of the world—caused by an increased sense of
threat or internal struggle among different policy factions—could shift the
balance between economics and security. A greater sense of encirclement by the
United States might prompt greater defense spending and/or an effort to
formalize alliance relationships. Chinese efforts to balance the United States
might provoke counterbalancing from ASEAN, to the detriment of economic
cooperation with China.
Conclusion
While
the increasing confidence of Chinese diplomacy in the region has often been
cast as a zero-sum competition with the United States, the end results may be
less disruptive and adversarial than predicted for at least two reasons.46
First, the other states of the region are not passive players, but are also
involved in shaping and reacting to China’s rise. Much depends on how we
perceive the behavior of the states on China’s periphery, and if we see them as
balancing, bandwagoning, or “hedging” against the rise of China. For example
Acharya describes the states of ASEAN as unwilling to rely on either Beijing or
Washington for their security and therefore engaged in “double binding”
–efforts to enmesh China and the United State in regional institutions. These
institutions have so far proven surprisingly flexible and durable in supporting
regional stability. There has been a tendency to see rising economic
cooperation as a sign of bandwagoning. But the smaller states of Southeast Asia
may be engaged in a strategy that mirrors Beijing’s own efforts to reassure the
region, using economic ties to reduce threat perception while improving defense
coordination with the United States. As Lyall Breckon argues, “U.S. trade and
security involvement in Southeast Asia, and improved U.S.-China relations
overall, may be necessary conditions for the climate of confidence in which
China has achieved its striking gains in Southeast Asia.”
Second,
in many respects, China’s current use of economic statecraft overlaps with many
US security concerns in the region. As Frost notes in her chapter: “Beijing’s
new commercial-diplomatic ‘embedded-ness’ bodes well for regional peace and
prosperity and is broadly consistent with U.S. interests – provided, and it is
a crucial proviso, that the United States stays engaged in the region.” For
example, Chinese plans for market oriented regional integration complement rather
than oppose U.S. interests. As Iain Johnston has noted, the evidence supporting
Beijing’s drive for regional hegemony is not clear cut.50 China’s increasing
military weight in the region could constrain American security capabilities.
Even
before the war in Iraq and the nuclear standoff with North Korea, U.S. military
planners were thinking about how to use a greater maritime emphasis and
long-distance strike capabilities to compensate for fewer U.S. bases and lack
of infrastructure in the region. But there is little evidence that China is
actively using economic ties to try and separate the United States from its
regional allies. In fact there is mixed evidence that China continues to see
the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan alliance as the basis of regional
stability.
As
the introduction and conclusion note, the overlap of Chinese and American
interests is not a given, and in large part depends on the attitudes,
behaviors, and responses to the rise of China by North and Southeast Asia, the
United States, and the Chinese themselves. The United States must in particular
hedge against two future possibilities. First, the primary focus on
international stability and internal development may not prevent the use of
coercion, despite the best intentions of China’s current leaders. As
Christensen notes, even if the pursuit of economic growth is Beijing’s main
policy goal, unease “about domestic stability and national integrity, and the
need for military might and nationalistic posturing, often make the
straightforward pursuit of national wealth an impossibility for the CCP.”52 A
legitimacy crisis, provoked by either domestic disturbance or external threats
to territorial integrity and national sovereignty, could derail the mainly
status-quo orientation of Beijing’s current foreign policy.
Moreover,
cooperative behavior from Beijing now may not ensure responsible action in the
future. Economic development may create a degree of lock-in for Beijing,
generating domestic expectations about continued growth and empowering social
forces in China that inhibit the flexibility of Beijing (much as U.S. business
interests influence Washington). But it is also possible that Beijing has
chosen to rely on influence because it does not yet have the ability to follow
through on coercive threats. Without the ability to project power and sustain a
military presence in maritime East Asia, military threats would be more than
counterproductive. They would expose Beijing’s weakness.
Given
the uncertainty about Chinese intentions (and the inability to block Beijing’s
rising influence), this chapter reinforces the point made by the introduction,
Frost and others: to maintain at the least the possibility of China’s peaceful
rise, the United States must actively reengage with Asia. China has benefited
from the perception that it is now the status quo power in Asia—in contrast to
what Breckon describes as a regional perception of the United States as
“unilateralist, given to preemptive military action, and insistent in pushing
an agenda that ignored Southeast Asian interests in favor of counterterrorism
and non-proliferation.”53 The United States must renew its interest in
developing multilateral trade agreements and institutions in the region, while
at the same time strengthening bilateral cooperation with Japan and India.
The
key for Washington is to realize that both the bilateral and multilateral paths
must be pursued in order to counter Beijing’s rapidly deepening multilateral
engagement with Asia.54 In effect, a policy that responds to the rise of China
should pay as much attention to the larger Asian framework as it does to China.
Tuesday, March 11, 2014
The Coup d'etats ( History)
Coup d’etats in Africa:
The Emergence, Prevalence and
Eradication
Introduction
A coup d’etat can be defined as a
“quick and decisive seizure of governmental power by a strong military or
political group. It is the sudden overthrow of a government, usually done by a
small group that just replaces the top power figures”.[1] In contrast to
a revolution, a coup d’etat does not involve a mass uprising. Rather, in a
typical coup, a small group of politicians or generals arrest the incumbent
leaders, seizes the national radio and television services, and proclaims
itself in power. The word coup d’etat is French for “stroke of the state” or
“blow to the government”.
Tactically, a coup usually involves control of some
active portion of the military while neutralizing the remainder of a country's
armed forces. This active group captures or expels leaders, seizes physical
control of important government offices, means of communication, and the
physical infrastructure, such as streets and power plants. The coup succeeds if
its opponents fail to dislodge the plotters, allowing them to consolidate their
position, obtain the surrender or compliance of the populace and surviving
armed forces, and claim legitimacy.
History
Coup d’etats have long been part of a political
tradition. Indeed, Julius Caesar who is best known as the most famous of Roman
generals made a coup and was the victim of another coup. Many Roman emperors,
such as Claudius the fourth Roman Emperor, came to power in coups.
In the late 20th century, coups occurred
most commonly in developing countries, particularly in Latin America (Brazil,
Chile, Bolivia and Argentina), Africa and Asia (Pakistan). Coups also occurred
in the Pacific (Fiji) and in Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain and the Soviet
Union). Since the 1980s, coups have been seen somewhat less frequently. Perhaps
a significant reason is the general inability to resolve the economic and
political problems of developing nations. This has made armed forces,
particularly in Latin America, much more reluctant to intervene in politics.
Hence, in contrast to past crisis, the armed forces have sat on the sidelines
through economic crisis such as the Asian crisis in Thailand in 1998 or the
Argentine crisis of 2002 and have tended to act only when the military
perceives itself as institutionally threatened by the civilian government, as
occurred in Pakistan in 1999.
Also, coup d’tats have often been seen as a means
for powerful nations to assure favorable outcomes in smaller foreign states. In
particular, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Soviet KGB
developed a reputation for supporting coups in states such as Chile and Afghanistan,
respectively. Such actions are substitutes for direct military intervention
which would have been more politically unpopular. The governments of France and
Britain have engineered coups as well.
Important coups in the 20th century [2]
- 1920: The Kapp Putsch, a failed coup attempt by the freïcorps Ehrhardt.
- 1923: The Beer Hall Putsch, a failed coup attempt by Adolf Hitler in Germany.
- 1926: Coup of Jozef Pilsudski in Poland.
- 1932: The Mäntsälä Rebellion, failed coup attempt by the Lapua Movement in Finland.
- 1932: The May 15th Incident, a military coup in Japan.
- 1933: Failed coup against Franklin D. Roosevelt in United States.
- 1934: Coup of Karlis Ulmanis in Latvia.
- 1934: Coup of Konstantin Päts in Estonia.
- 1935: Coup in Greece.
- 1936: Part of the army seizes control of parts of Spain commencing the Spanish Civil War. Later General Francisco Franco assumes control of the country.
- 1936: The February 26th Incident, a failed coup attempt in Japan by junior military officers that did succeed in installing a military government.
- 1942: French resistance coup in Algiers.
- 1943: Military coup in Argentina.
- 1944: The July 20th Plot, a failed coup attempt in Nazi Germany led by Claus von Stauffenberg.
- 1945: Getúlio Vargas's government ends due to a coup.
- 1947: Coup in Thailand.
- 1948: Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, leading to a one-party totalitarian state in one of the then Soviet states.
- 1952: Military coup in Egypt.
- 1953: Anglo-American coup in Iran, code-named Operation Ajax.
- 1954: Military coup in Paraguay.
- 1955: A contra-coup in Brazil grants the presidency to elected one, Juscelino Kubitschek.
- 1958: Military coup in Pakistan. Army Chief and Defence Minister General Ayub Khan overthrows the government of Iskander Mirza and becomes President after a winning a rigged referendum.
- 1958: Civic/Military coup in Venezuela, overthrowing Marcos Perez Jimenez.
- 1958: Military coup in Iraq overthrows the monarchy.
- 1959: 26th of July Movement in Cuba, led by Fidel Castro and accompanied by Che Guevara, overthrows the Batista government.
- 1960: Military coup in Turkey.
- 1961: The Coup d'état of May Sixteenth in South Korea. Park Chunghee established presidency.
- 1962: Failed military backed and Catholic action led coup in Sri Lanka then Ceylon.
- 1963: Military coup in South Vietnam, overthrowing Ngo Dinh Diem.
- 1963: Military coup in Ecuador.
- 1963: Military coup in Syria.
- 1963: Coup in Iraq, followed by a counter-coup.
- 1964: Military coup in Brazil.
- 1964: Military coup in South Vietnam, overthrowing Duong Van Minh.
- 1966: Military coup in Ghana.
- 1967: Military coup in Greece.
- 1968: Coup in Panama by Omar Torrijos.
- 1968: Coup in Iraq establishes rule of the Ba'ath Party.
- 1969: Colonel Qadhafi overthrows monarchy in Libya.
- 1969: Military coup in Somalia.
- 1970: Military coup in Pakistan. Army Chief General Yahya Khan forces President Field Marshal Ayub Khan (who himself came to power in a coup) to hand over power to him.
- 1970: Coup in Bolivia, soon followed by a leftist countercoup.
- 1971: Military coup in Turkey (Coup by Memorandum).
- 1973: Military coup in Chile.
- 1973: The President of Uruguay dissolves Parliament and heads a coup.
- 1974: Military coup in Portugal (Carnation Revolution).
- 1975: Military coup in Bangladesh overthrows and kills Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
- 1976: Military coup in Ecuador.
- 1976: Military coup in Argentina.
- 1979: Military coup in Pakistan. Army Chief General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq overthrows the civilian government and hangs Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto after a sham trial.
- 1979: The Coup d'état of December 12th in South Korea. Chun Doo-hwan established president ship.
- 1980: Military coup in Turkey.
- 1980: Military coup in Liberia.
- 1980: Successful coup in Suriname by military officers led by Dési Bouterse that resulted in military rule until 1988.
- 1981: Failed coup in Spain led by Antonio Tejero.
- 1991: Failed coup attempt in the Soviet Union.
- 1992: Alberto Fujimori launches a self-coup in Peru.
Recent coups and coup attempts [3]
- 1999: Military coup in Pakistan.
- 1999: Military coup in Ivory Coast.
- 2000: Military coup in Fiji.
- 2000: Coup in Ecuador.
- 2000: Overthrow of President Fujimori in Peru.
- 2002: Unsuccessful coup to overthrow Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.
- 2002: Military coup in Central African Republic.
- 2003: Attempted coup in Mauritania.
- 2003: Military coup in São Tomé and Príncipe.
- 2003: Military coup in Guinea-Bissau.
- 2004: Military coup in Haiti.
- 2004: Two attempted coups in Mauritania.
- 2004: Attempted coup in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
- 2004: Second attempted coup in the Democratic Republic of Congo (June).
- 2004: Attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea (August).
- 2005: Coup in Togo legalized by parliamentary vote but unrecognized by international community.
- 2005: Coup in Ecuador overthrows Lúcio Gutierrez.
- 2005 Coup by Nepalese monarch, overthrows constitutional monarchy. Restoration of absolute monarchy.
- 2005: Coup in Mauritania.
Rate
of Success of Coups [4]
Current leaders who came to power via coups [5]
- Fidel Castro, President of Cuba (1959 - Present)
- Muammar al - Qaddafi, leader of Libya (1969 - Present)
- Pervez Musharraf, leader of Pakistan (1999 - Present)
- Omar Hassan Ahmad al - Bashir, leader of Sudan (1989 - Present)
- Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, President of Equatorial Guinea (1979 - Present)
- Idriss Déby, President of Chad (1990 - Present)
- Yahya Jammeh, President of The Gambia (1994 - Present)
- Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, President of Tunisia (1987 - Present)
- Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso (1987 - Present)
- Lansana Conté, President of Guinea (1984 - Present)
- Ely Ould Mohammed Vall, leader of Mauritania (2005 - Present)
- Azali Assoumani, President of the Comoros (1999 - Present)
- François Bozizé, President of the Central African Republic (2003 - Present)
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Types of coups
There are three main types of coups: Presidential coup, palace coup and Putsch. A presidential coup can defined as the “temporary suspension of constitutional guarantees and closure of the executive, which rules by decree, and uses referenda and new legislative elections to ratify a regime with broader executive powers.” [6] This occurs when a democratically elected president converts the regime into a dictatorship with the objective to expand and increase executive power. There have been two well known presidential coups in the 1990s: Peru and Guatemala. In the case of Peru, Alberto Fujimori comes to power in 1990 but fails to secure control over congress. Overtime relations between executive and congress deteriorate. In April 1992, two years after coming to power, President Fujimori closes congress, suspends the constitution, fires judges and declares an emergency rule. The Peruvian military offers Fujimori institutional support and the public rallies behind him. Congressional elections are later held in November 1992 and Fujimori is re-elected in 1995. [7] In Guatemala, Jorge Serrano comes to power in 1990 and also fails to secure control over congress. Also, relations between executive and congress deteriorate with time. President Serrano uses discretionary spending power to build congressional support. When the bill backfires, Serrano closes congress, suspends the constitution, declares an emergency rule and immediately calls for new elections. Unfortunately, the constitutional court challenges the legality of Serrano’s actions and the electoral board, the military, civil society and international pressure rally against Serrano. An interim president is appointed and Serrano is exiled.[8] There are numerous other recent cases of Presidential coups: Russia in 1993 when Boris Yeltsin expanded executive powers. Kazakhstan in 1994 when Nursultan Nazarbaev dissolved parliament and wrote a new constitution with expanded executive powers. Belarus in 1996 when Alexander Lukashenko changed the constitution. Philippines in 1973 when Ferdinand Marcos converted his elected government into a dictatorship.
Palace coups take place within political structures of existing regimes. It involves the plotting of rivals of the president within the ruling group. The objective of palace coups is the replacement of the president through constitutional action. Assassinations are also a key feature of palace coups and for success military support is often needed. Palace coups are characterized by deep conspiracy and secrecy, are usually bloodless with very little destruction and are quick and effective. A recent example of a palace coup is the assassination of President Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2001. Other examples of palace coups include the Nigerian coup in 1974 in which Generals Murtala Mohamed and Olusegun Obasanjo overthrew General Yakubu Gowon. Another palace coup in Nigeria occurred in 1994 when General Sani Abacha staged a coup to block the transition from military to civilian rule/democracy.
A putsch is a violent military uprising by a group within the military, but not within the ruling group. It involves a conspiracy for the seizure of key military targets and the subsequent seizure of state power. Examples of putsches include the Chilean coup in 1973, the Central African Republic coup in 2003 and the Cote d’Ivoire coup in 1999.
Coup d’etats in Africa
Post colonial Africa has been hobbled by
illegitimate political takeovers. According to research by Patrick McGowan,[9] a
professor of political science at Arizona State University in Tempe, in
sub-Saharan Africa between 1956 and 2001 there were 80 successful coups, 108
failed coup attempts, and 139 reported coup plots. There have been 11 attempted
or successful coups since then.
Equatorial Guinea
The most recent attempted coup in Africa was that
to oust President Teodoro Obiang Nguema
Mbasogo of oil-rich Equatorial Guinea who himself came to power through a coup
in 1979. Since independence in 1968, Equatorial Guinea has been ruled by two
men, from the same family, who have been described by a variety of human rights
organization as among the worst abusers of human rights in Africa. In the
1970s, Equatorial Guinea became notorious when the widespread human rights
abuses of President Francisco Nguema caused a third of the population to flee.
In 1979, Francisco Nguema was overthrown by his nephew, the current president.
The former leader was tried and executed. The new president proclaimed an
amnesty for refugees and released some 5,000 political prisoners, but kept the
absolute control he had inherited.[10]
In the mid-1990s, large oil and gas deposits were
discovered off Bioko, making Equatorial Guinea one of Africa's biggest oil
producers. But few ordinary people are benefiting from the economic boom.
Despite international calls for greater financial transparency in the sector,
President Obiang has said oil revenue figures are a state secret.
In 1996, Equatorial Guinea's first multi-party
presidential election was held amid reports of widespread fraud and
irregularities, returning President Obiang Nguema with 99% of the vote. His
government has been accused of widespread human rights abuses and of
suppressing political opposition. A government-in-exile has been formed by
opposition leaders living in exile in Spain.
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In March 2004, authorities in Zimbabwe impounded a
plane which flew in from South Africa with 64 alleged mercenaries on board. The
mercenaries were on their way to Equatorial Guinea to oust the government of
President Obiang Nguema and had stopped in Zimbabwe to pick up ammunition.
Simon Mann, a British ex-SAS officer from a wealthy family and with previous
involvement in mercenary operations, was leading the group and appeared to have
been the main instigator of the coup attempt. An additional 17 mercenaries were
arrested in Equatorial Guinea when the coup attempt was thwarted. Their leader,
Nick Du Toit, was sentenced to 34 years in prison, with most of
the others receiving heavy sentences. Du Toit was the only mercenary to admit
he was taking part in an attempted coup.
It was also found that Mark Thatcher, the son of the former UK Primer
Minister Margaret Thatcher, had engineered and financed the coup. Mr. Thatcher,
who was arrested at his home in South Africa, pleaded guilty to helping finance
the coup plot. An increasing amount of evidence had strengthened the case
against Mr. Thatcher as South African police were able to prove that Mr.
Thatcher had transferred about USD 285,000 to the mercenaries that were to
execute the operation and had met and talked frequently to them prior to the
coup attempt. [11]
Under the threat of being extradited to Equatorial Guinea or being condemned to a prison sentence in South Africa, Mr. Thatcher reportedly negotiated a deal with the prosecutor. In exchange for his confession and further cooperation with the court, the British businessman was to avoid prison and extradition. When Mr. Thatcher entered his guilty plea he claimed he thought the helicopter, which he had bought for the alleged coup plotters, would be used for humanitarian works. After pleading guilty, he was immediately handed down a five-year suspended prison sentence and a fine of about USD 560,000. [12]
Under the threat of being extradited to Equatorial Guinea or being condemned to a prison sentence in South Africa, Mr. Thatcher reportedly negotiated a deal with the prosecutor. In exchange for his confession and further cooperation with the court, the British businessman was to avoid prison and extradition. When Mr. Thatcher entered his guilty plea he claimed he thought the helicopter, which he had bought for the alleged coup plotters, would be used for humanitarian works. After pleading guilty, he was immediately handed down a five-year suspended prison sentence and a fine of about USD 560,000. [12]
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It was later revealed that two reports on the background to the
attempted coup were sent in December 2003 and January 2004 by South African
security expert Johann Smith to British intelligence and to Michael Westphal,
senior colleague of Donald Rumsfeld and deputy assistant secretary of defense.[13] According to
the Observer, the second report warned the coup would take place in March 2004
and that “knowing the individuals as well as I do, this timeline is very
realistic and will provide for ample time to plan, mobilize, equip and deploy
the force.” Smith, a former commander in the South African Special Forces and
apparently now working for the Equatorial Guinea regime, was given information
by some of the South African mercenaries involved. He claims he has received
death threats since the coup attempt and that he received no acknowledgements
from Britain or the United States.
The Observer concludes by pointing out that everything points to the
British, American and also the Spanish governments giving tacit support to a
privately funded plot to remove the president of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro
Obiang, and replace him with Severo Moto, a leading opponent of the regime
living in exile in Spain. Obiang is said to be in poor health and, whilst the
Bush administration and Western regimes are on good terms with this despot,
there are fears that if he dies there will be a struggle between possible
successors.
Fear of such instability must also be of concern to the oil corporations
involved, such as ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco, as Equatorial Guinea is now the
third largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa. The tiny country of less than
500,000 people had a gross domestic product of USD 1.85 billion in 2001 and
churns out 350,000 barrels of oil a day. It has vast oil reserves, estimated to
be approximately 10 percent of the total global reserves, according to the US
Department of Energy. US oil companies have invested USD 3 billion in the
country since 1995. A report by a US Senate committee revealed hundreds of
millions of dollars had been deposited by Obiang, his family and associates in
the Washington-based Riggs Bank “with little or no attention to the bank’s
anti-money laundering obligations....”.
Mauritania
The most recent successful coup in Africa took place in Mauritania, a
largely desert country. With President Taya out of
the country for the funeral of the Saudi king, a group of army officers staged
a bloodless coup on August 3rd 2005 and announced the formation of a military
council. The council, headed by Colonel Ely Ould Mohammed Vall, said it had
acted to end a "totalitarian" regime and promised to hold
presidential elections within two years. Many Mauritanians welcomed the move.
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Colonel Vall has been head of national security
since 1987 and, after playing a key role in the 1984 coup which brought Mr.
Taya to power, had been seen as one of the president's closest aides. One of
the new leader's first acts was to free 21 Islamists, jailed by the previous
government. Citing the threat of terrorism, the previous government cracked
down on Islamist activists. Critics maintained that the action was aimed at
stifling political opposition.
The ousted president, Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya,
survived previous challenges to his rule; a coup attempt in 2003 was put down
after heavy fighting between loyal troops and rebel soldiers. Two more alleged
coup attempts were thwarted in 2004. Mr. Taya seized power in 1984 as head of a
military junta. After multi-party polls in 1992 he headed civilian governments.
He was re-elected for a third time in 2003, gaining 67% of the first-round
vote.[14]
Opposition groups said polling had been marred by fraud and intimidation.
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Recommendation: Ending Coups in Africa
Foreign Intervention: Western powers
Recently Pat Robertson, a US religious broadcaster
called for the US to assassinate Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Mr.
Robertson described Mr. Chavez as “a terrific danger” and accused the United
States of failing to act when Mr. Chavez was briefly overthrown in 2002. Mr.
Robertson, founder of the Christian Coalition
of America and a former presidential candidate said: "You know, I don't
know about this doctrine of assassination, but if he thinks we're trying to
assassinate him, I think that we really ought to go ahead and do it. It's a
whole lot cheaper than starting a war ... and I don't think any oil shipments
will stop." [15]
Mr. Robertson's remarks come amid tense diplomatic
relations between Venezuela and Washington. President Chavez is a regular
critic of the US, which regards Venezuela as a possible source of instability
in the region. Mr. Chavez has accused Washington of conspiring to topple his
government and possibly backing plots to assassinate him. US officials have
called the accusations ridiculous.
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Mr. Robertson’s remarks confirm the role Western powers often play in toppling foreign governments, especially ones in developing nations. The United States, Britain and Spain were implicated in the attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea. Even after having received substantial and credible evidence about the coup, both nations failed to the very least inform the government of Equatorial Guinea. Two months after the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly known as Zaire) became independent, Mobutu Sese Sekou overthrew the government and took power in a CIA backed military coup. [16]
In order to bring an end to coups in the continent, African leaders need to examine the role of foreign intervention by Western powers. Western powers look for ways of replacing governments they “deem” is a threat to the region, uncooperative, unfriendly and/or critical of their policies. They tend to back rebel groups trying to overthrow democratically elected governments. When such a government is endowed with natural resources such as oil or other precious minerals then the likelihood of such an intervention becomes very likely. Foreign intervention by Western powers resulted in a 27- year civil war in Angola in which the Angolan Rebel Leader of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), Jonas Savimbi was funded in the fight against the Angolan elected government.
Foreign Intervention: Western Individuals
African governments should also look at the role played by foreign nationals in trying to topple democratically elected governments. Mr. Mark Thatcher pleaded guilty to funding a foiled coup in Equatorial Guinea. Unfortunately, he was handed down a five-year suspended prison sentence and a fine of about USD 560,000 whereas some of the mercenaries were given long jail sentences. Foreign nationals implicated in engineering and/or financing coups should carry as much of the burden as the mercenaries that actually carry out the coup. Countries whose citizens are implicated in coup attempts should be deterred from making their nation a safe haven for coup plotters because the latter are as dangerous as terrorists. Such citizens should stand trial in their home country or be extradited to the other nation to face charges.
Establishment of democratic governments
In order to prevent coups, African nations need to
establish democratic governments, adopt an independent electoral code to ensure
free and fair voting in elections, encourage freedom of speech, and respect for
human rights and the constitution. For example, President Omar Bongo of Gabon
has been ruler since 1967. He has won multiple presidential elections all of
which have been marred by fraud and irregularity. Under changes to the
constitution made in 2003 President Bongo may run for office for as many times
as he wishes. [17]
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, President of Libya, came to power in a bloodless coup
in 1969. Muammar Gaddafi, a shrewd leader, is the Arab world's longest-serving
leader and has survived several attempts on his life. [18]
These are just two of the many African
leaders who have come to power either democratically or illegitimately and have
refused to step down. They torture members of opposition parties, rig municipal
and presidential elections, censor newspapers, radio and television stations
that are critical of the despotic government, intimidate members of the press
that are opposed to the government’s policies and amend the constitution so
that the current leader and his political party can rule the nation indefinitely.
African governments that cultivate such
undemocratic regimes promote members of opposition parties and the military to
carry out a coup as that is the only way in which the current government can
step down and much-needed reforms brought about. African leaders need to
promote dialogue among the many political parties and encourage the
participation of opposition parties in the government. As such nationals who
are displeased with the current regime can voice their opinion through the use
of ballot boxes. If such an opportunity is taken away and the government in
power represses its nationals, then many would resolve to toppling the
government illegitimately.
Role of the African Union
The role of the African
Union is perhaps the most important of all in bringing an end to coups on the
continent. The African Union,
formerly known as the Organization for African Unity (OAU), has made
commendable progress in getting rid of the colonialist influence. The creation
of the AU marked a realization by African nations that the OAU had been put in
place by the colonial powers to maintain control of the continent and its
profits. Such realization, while laudable, should be extended to maintaining
security on the continent. The African Union should cease to recognize with
time leaders who come to power illegitimately. The African Union should compel
African nations to promote good governance and set limits for presidential
terms. Strategic changes in the constitution to allow the current president and
his ruling party to stay in power indefinitely should be discouraged and
penalties meted out to governments who fail to uphold the law. The African
Union should collaborate with the United States, the European Union and even
with the South American Community of Nations in excluding member nations who
fail to bring their nationals to justice when they have been implicated in
attempted coups. Laws should be enacted so that severe actions are meted out
against member nations or individuals involved in coups. Task forces should be
set up to examine the role of foreign nations/individuals in the many coups
that have plagued the continent thus far. Those found guilty should be held
accountable for all the atrocities and lives lost during the conflict.
Conclusion
Coups may fail because of a combination of reasons: the intelligence
services of the government may detect the coup in its infancy; there may be a
"rat" within the group; a friendly foreign intelligence service may
detect the coup in its planning stage and inform the targeted government; the officers that were not co-opted may
resist the coups and repel the "invading forces"; one of the vital
units may not reach its intended destination; loyal government troops may repel
the coup plotters; and in rare cases, the general public or the international
community may protest the coup, condemn the coup plotters and refuse to
recognize the "new government" thereby forcing the renegade soldiers
to return to the barracks. For instance the coup in Sao Tome and Principe
"failed" because of Nigeria and the international community’s
objection to the overthrow of the incumbent government. Nonetheless, African
leaders must make an effort in maintaining security and democracy on the
continent by enacting and enforcing laws and regulations and providing an
environment that deters coups.
[1] http://www.answers.com/topic/coup-d-tat
[2] http://www.answers.com/topic/coup-d-tat
[3] http://www.answers.com/topic/coup-d-tat
[4] http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/13No3/ENgoma.htm
[5] http://www.answers.com/topic/coup-d-tat
[6]
http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/politics/ug/POL238F/Breakdown%20of%20Democratic%20Regimes%20Week%204.ppt#259,4,Overview
of Research and Literature on Regime Breakdown
[7]
http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/politics/ug/POL238F/Breakdown%20of%20Democratic%20Regimes%20Week%204.ppt#263,8,Types
of Coups Presidential, Palace and Putsch
[8]
http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/politics/ug/POL238F/Breakdown%20of%20Democratic%20Regimes%20Week%204.ppt#265,9,Types
of Coups Presidential, Palace and Putsch
[9] http://www.dehai.org/archives/dehai_news_archive/aug04/0532.html
[10]
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1023151.stm
[11] http://www.afrol.com/articles/15309
[12] http://www.afrol.com/articles/15309
[13] http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/dec2004/guine-d07.shtml
[14]
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/791083.stm
[15] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4177664.stm
[16]
http://www.ssn.flinders.edu.au/global/africa/marcroberts/body.htm
[17] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1023203.stm
[18]
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/819291.stm
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